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[T]he privacy and dignity of our citizens [are] being whittled 
away by sometimes imperceptible steps. Taken individually, each 
step may be of little consequence. But when viewed as a whole, 
there begins to emerge a society quite unlike any we have seen --
a society in which government may intrude into the secret 
regions of a [person's] life at will.1
I. INTRODUCTION
John Roe,2 until recently, was a police officer for the city of San Diego; 
that is, until his supervising sergeant discovered that in his free time John 
enjoyed stripping off a police uniform, masturbating in front of a video 
camera, and selling the resulting pornography on eBay.3  Not surprisingly, 
the San Diego Police Department (SDPD) demanded that John cease and 
1
 Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323, 343 (1966) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting).
2
 "John Roe" is a fictitious name given to the plaintiff in the case of City 
of San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 522 (2004) (per curiam).  So that the 
reader does not confuse San Diego v. Roe with the more well-known case of 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), this paper refers to the former as John 
Roe.
3 See John Roe, 125 S.Ct. at 522.  
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desist in producing or distributing any materials of a sexually explicit 
nature, believing that such off-duty conduct not only violated a number of 
internal police regulations, but also adversely impacted the SDPD's mission 
and functions.4  When John did not completely cease his explicit 
extracurricular activities as ordered, he was fired.5   In a per curiam decision 
from the October 2004 term, the United States Supreme Court held that 
John Roe was not denied his rights to free expression under the First 
Amendment by the SDPD's actions, as he was not expressing himself on a 
"matter of public concern."6
Putting aside the lurid nature of this case of the pornographic 
policeman, John Roe raises significant constitutional questions regarding 
the extent to which the government may condition public employment on 
which activities employees decide to undertake in their private and personal 
lives.7  Traditionally, under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the 
Supreme Court has limited the government's ability to condition 
governmental benefits, including public employment, on the basis of 
individuals forfeiting their constitutional rights.8  Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has most often applied the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions to 
scrutinize employment terminations of public employees for exercising 
their First Amendment free speech rights.9
4 Id. at 522-523, 526.
5 Id. at 523.
6 Id. at 523-24.
7
 The fact that the federal constitutional issues raised herein apply 
directly only to public employment should in no way diminish the 
significance of these legal issues.  There are over 21 million federal, state, 
and local government employees in the United States, who make up roughly 
16.5% of the nation's workforce. See U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 298 
(2004-2005) (Table No. 453) (figure from 2002); JOSEPH R. GRODIN, JUNE 
M. WEISBERGER & MARTIN H. MALIN, PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 1 (2004).   
8 See Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion Without Baselines: 
Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1, 2-3 
(2001).
9 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 (1972).  Since Perry, 
the Supreme Court has decided a number of these First Amendment public 
employment cases.  See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); 
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Givhan v. Western Line 
Consolidated School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); and Mt. Healthy City Bd. 
of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
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In the First Amendment context, the Court has developed the well-
honed, if not entirely satisfactory, Connick/Pickering doctrinal analysis.  
Taken together, Connick and Pickering forbid public employers from taking 
adverse employment actions against employees for speaking out on "matters 
of public concern," unless, under a constitutional balancing test, the 
governmental interest in efficiency outweighs the employee's First 
Amendment rights.10  Indeed, it was under this First Amendment analysis 
that the Supreme Court dismissed John Roe's case against the SDPD.11
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's recent decision in Lawrence v. 
Texas,12 with its recognition of a more robust "liberty interest"13 in forming 
one's identity through meaningful human relationships in one’s personal and 
private life, has drastically altered the constitutional landscape as concerns 
when the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions comes into play in the 
public employment context.  This is because, in Lawrence, the Supreme 
10 See generally Connick, 461 U.S. at 143; and Pickering v. Bd. of 
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).   
11 See San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2004) (per curiam).  Of 
course, in John Roe, the Supreme Court did not need to engage in a 
constitutional balancing act, as John's conduct did not meet the threshold 
public concern test.  See id.
12
 539 U.S. 558 (2003).  
13
 The focus on "liberty interests" rather than "privacy rights," is 
consistent with the fact that Justice Kennedy utilizes the word "liberty" 
much more in his opinion for the court than the more amorphous "privacy" 
language.  My guess is that his choice in this regard was purposeful as he 
sought to anchor this newly-minted interest in the concrete liberty language 
of the substantive component of the Due Process Clause.  Accord Randy E. 
Barnett, Correspondence, Grading Justice Kennedy: A Reply to Professor 
Carpenter, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1582, 1589 (2005) ("The fact that Justice
Kennedy does not [announce a fundamental right to privacy]--that this 
doctrinal dog does not bark--makes Lawrence in my view a 'potentially 
revolutionary' liberty-protecting case."); and Erin Daly, The New Liberty, 
11 WIDENER L. REV. 221, 233 (2005) ("Both Casey and Lawrence self-
consciously shift the focus of substantive due process away from privacy 
and back toward its textual anchor, liberty. This avoids the principal 
objection to the Court's post-Griswold privacy jurisprudence-that it lacks 
textual support.").  See also Note, Unfixing Lawrence, 118 HARV. L. REV.
2858, 2868 (2005) (arguing that there "is a strategic equivocation between 
privacy and liberty," in Lawrence to advance, "whether knowingly or not, . . 
.a strategically powerful complex. The two terms of the complex sustain 
and limit one another.").  
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Court construed an individual’s liberty interest in decisional non-
interference in private affairs14 as a heightened one due a more searching 
form of rational basis review.15 Consequently, a previously neglected
aspect of Lawrence is that it almost certainly trumpets the beginning of a 
new era of greater privacy protection for public employees, as adverse 
employment actions taken against them on the basis of their decisions about 
their private affairs will be subject to a more searching scrutiny.
This paper therefore argues that Lawrence signals the fulfillment of a 
certain constitutional tradition initiated by Justice Brandeis in his eloquent 
dissent in Olmstead v. United States,16 most recently revived in the joint 
opinion of three Justices in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey,17 and, for the first time, adopted by a majority of the 
Court in Lawrence.18  In short, post-Lawrence, the government employer
can no longer terminate an employee merely because that employee does 
not live up to the employer's conception of morality in how she lives her 
private and personal life (especially in matters pertaining to sex).19
Because the current Connick/Pickering framework has been molded to 
apply to the First Amendment framework, which focuses on the nature of 
14 See Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV.
(forthcoming) (“Decisional interference involves the government’s 
incursion into people’s decisions regarding their private affairs.”) (emphasis 
in original) (on file with author); see also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 
599-600 (1977) (finding one form of privacy consisting of the “interest in 
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.”).
15 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.  Although not every jurist and 
commentator agrees that Lawrence applies more than a traditional rational 
basis review to rights of decisional non-interference in private affairs, the 
vast majority does.  See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Body Politics: Lawrence 
v. Texas and the Constitution of Disgust and Contagion, 57 FLA. L. REV. 
1011, 1032 (2005) ("[F]ew constitutional scholars think the narrowest or the 
broadest reading of Lawrence is correct. Its charged reasoning cannot be 
limited to the sodomy context alone, but neither does it entail same-sex 
marriage.").
16
 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
17
 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (joint opinion).
18
 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
19 Id. at 572 (observing the “emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”); State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 
34-35 (Kan. 2005) (finding, based on Lawrence, that moral disapproval of a 
group cannot be a legitimate government interest).
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the speech or expression engaged in by the employee, it cannot readily be
applied to the Lawrence substantive due process context and needs 
reworking to protect these new constitutional interests.  Consequently, this 
article proposes an original constitutional balancing analysis, the modified 
Pickering analysis, to more appropriately weigh a public employee's interest 
in decisional non-interference in private affairs against the employer's 
interest in running an efficient governmental service.20
In order to concretely demonstrate how the modified Pickering analysis 
will apply to the liberty interests announced in Lawrence, this paper revisits 
the Supreme Court’s decision in City of San Diego v. Roe.  While this paper 
concludes that the outcome of John Roe would most likely have been 
decided in the same manner under this modified analysis because of 
heightened governmental efficiency concerns and the relatively minimal 
substantive due process rights of John Roe under the circumstances;21
nevertheless, the more important point is that the appropriate form of 
constitutional balancing of relevant interests in future substantive due 
process cases will certainly lead to public employees having greater legal 
protection from arbitrary interference by government employers into their
private affairs.22
  This article presents the emergence of these post-Lawrence public 
employee interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs, and the 
concomitant modified Pickering test, in five parts.  Part II will discuss the 
historical foundations of the Supreme Court’s maddening doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions and, in particular, the unique character of those 
unconstitutional conditions cases in which the government acts in its 
capacity as an employer.  Part III will then review the development of 
substantive due process jurisprudence in the privacy context over the last 
century and describe how Lawrence v. Texas represents the fulfillment of an 
expansive view of these constitutional rights in the form of the interest in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs. Based on this new 
constitutional development, Part IV will next propose a modified version of 
the Pickering test, which simultaneously discards the Connick public 
20
 To be clear, although this new test is denominated the "modified 
Pickering analysis," this test is not meant to apply to First Amendment 
public employee disputes.  For those cases, the Connick/Pickering line still 
applies; this modified analysis is only for weighing public employees' 
substantive due process rights post-Lawrence against an employers' 
efficiency concerns. It is because of the constitutional balancing analysis 
set up in Pickering that this new test has been so named.
21 See infra Part V.A.2.
22 See infra Part V.B.  
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concern test and more appropriately, from the start, weighs public 
employees’ interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs against 
government employers' efficiency concerns.  Finally, in an attempt to 
discern the analytical strengths and weaknesses of this new test, Part V will 
apply the modified Pickering analysis to the John Roe case and some real 
world public employee cases and hypothetical scenarios.
II.  THE DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS IN PUBLIC 
EMPLOYMENT
To begin to understand the inadequacy of the existing unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine in public employment with regard to the substantive due 
process rights of public employees post-Lawrence, it is first necessary to 
explore the legal boundaries of the current doctrine.  The following three 
sections undertake a brief analysis of the historical foundations of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine, then analyze the Connick/Pickering 
line of public employee free speech cases, and finally highlight the peculiar 
lack of unconstitutional conditions in employment cases outside of the First 
Amendment.
A.  A Brief Introduction to the Historical Foundations of the Doctrine
  Historically, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions first 
enjoyed widespread use in the early part of the 20th century when the 
Lochner Court23 developed economic substantive due process.24 Under 
economic substantive due process, the Lochner Court emphasized property 
23 See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905) (utilizing a 
substantive due process analysis to strike down maximum hour laws for 
bakers because of its "arbitrary interference with the right of the individual 
to personal liberty."), overruled in part by Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 
706 (1963), and Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952).  
24
 The Lochner Court constitutionalized property rights and the liberty 
to contract under a theory of economic substantive due process, as a means 
to strike down much social welfare legislation during the first part of the 
20th century.  See, e.g., Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) 
(invalidating a federal law prohibiting interstate carriers from terminating 
workers for union membership), overruled in part by Phelps Dodge Corp. v. 
NLRB, 313 U.S. 177 (1941).  For a comprehensive analysis of the various 
meanings ascribed to the Lochnerian Era, see generally Sujit Choudhry, The 
Lochner Era and Comparative Constitutionalism, 2 INT'L J. CONST. L. 1 
(2004).
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rights and the freedom to contract.25  During the zenith of this period, the 
Court held that states could not condition corporate privileges upon the 
forfeiture of economic substantive due process rights.26  This limitation on 
the government's ability to use its various powers to limit individual's 
constitutional rights was really in hindsight the first incarnation of the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. 
But with the "switch in time that saved nine"27 and the ascendancy of 
President Roosevelt's New Deal Court in the late 1930's and early 1940's, 
the Lochner era came to an abrupt halt.28  In the ensuing period, a new 
Supreme Court abolished much of the Lochner Court's economic 
substantive due process jurisprudence and, as a result, the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions itself went through a substantial period of 
disuse.29 Shortly thereafter, however, the Warren Court of the 1950s and 
1960s rescued the doctrine from the dustbin of legal history and began to 
apply it to a number of cases involving civil rights and civil liberties.30
25 See, e.g., Adair, 208 U.S. 161 (invalidating a federal law prohibiting 
interstate carriers from terminating workers for union membership); 
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (striking down a Kansas statute that 
prohibited employers from conditioning employment on the employee's 
agreement to refrain from joining a labor organization); Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (striking down a minimum wage 
law for women).
26
 Richard A. Epstein, Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power, and 
the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 104 n.7 (1988) 
("[Unconstitutional conditions first] appear in Justice Bradley's dissent in 
Doyle v. Continental Insurance Co., 94 U.S. 535 (1876): 'Though a State 
may have the power, if it sees fit to subject its citizens to the inconvenience, 
of prohibiting all foreign corporations from transacting business within its 
jurisdiction, it has no power to impose unconstitutional conditions upon 
their doing so.' Id. at 543 (Bradley, J., dissenting).").
27 See William H. Rehnquist, Judicial Independence, 38 U. RICH. L. 
REV. 579, 593-94 (2004) (quoting FRED R. SHAPIRO, THE OXFORD 
DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL QUOTATIONS 393 (1993)).
28
 Indeed, Lochner itself was eventually "implicitly rejected."  See
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977). See also Griswold v. 
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) ("We do not sit as a super-legislature 
to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic 
problems, business affairs, or social conditions.").
29 See Kathleen A. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. 
REV. 1413, 1416 (1989).
30 See Epstein, supra note 26, at 104.
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Many of these more recent unconstitutional conditions cases have 
involved the government acting in its role as a sovereign,31 seeking to 
induce certain preferred outcomes through use of government subsidies and 
tax exemptions.32  In these "government subsidy" cases, the government 
seeks to utilize its Spending Clause Power33 to award government largesse 
to individuals in return for their agreeing to significant burdens on their 
"preferred rights," especially their rights to speech, expression, and 
association under the First Amendment.34
The Supreme Court has responded to this aggressive use of Congress' 
Spending Clause Power by reinvigorating the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions.  While not anchored in any single clause of the Federal 
Constitution, the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions has been called a 
"creature of judicial implication."35  In its simplest terms, the modern form 
of the doctrine prohibits the government from conditioning a governmental 
benefit based on an individual’s forfeiting a constitutional right under 
certain circumstances.36  Although what the unconstitutional conditions 
31
 As will be discussed in detail below, government can either act in its 
sovereign or employer capacity.  See infra Part II.B.1.  
32 See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960); and Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
33
 The Spending Clause of the United States Constitution states: "The
Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and 
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general 
Welfare of the United States . . . ."  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  Congress 
is allowed to provide incentives under its Spending Clause Powers, but it 
may not coerce federal funding recipients through this power.  See South 
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210 (1987) ("[Congress may not induce the 
recipient of federal funding] to engage in activities that would themselves 
be unconstitutional.").  
34
 A considerable amount of dissonance exists between two different 
groups of Justices, and indeed there are two different schools of 
jurisprudential thought concerning the application of the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine in these so-called "government subsidy" cases.  See 
Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1415-16 (noting the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions is "a minefield to be traversed gingerly," and "riven with 
inconsistencies").  Fortunately, this debate does not arise in employment 
cases and is, therefore, beyond the scope of this article.  For an in-depth 
discussion of these cases, see generally Sullivan, supra note 29; and 
Berman, supra note 8. 
35 See Epstein, supra note 26, at 10.
36 See Berman, supra note 8, at 3 ("[I]t is now universally recognized 
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doctrine holds is generally uncontested, specifying the "certain 
circumstances" under which the doctrine is thought to apply is a completely 
different story.37
For instance, Dean Sullivan attempts to limit the doctrine to incursions 
into "preferred rights."38  Professor Berman, for his part, believes that this is 
an unhelpful distinction because there is generally much disagreement over 
what should and should not be a preferred right.39  Regardless, this paper 
follows Sullivan's "conventional formulation" regarding the scope of the 
unconstitutional conditions doctrine.  Indeed, a cursory survey of the 
different types of cases in which the doctrine has been applied over the 
years appears to track mostly instances involving arguably "preferred" 
rights.40  For instance, the doctrine has been applied to First Amendment 
that [governmental] conditional offers are sometimes constitutionally 
permissible and sometimes not.  Indeed, correctly understood, that is all the 
famed and contentious unconstitutional conditions doctrine holds."). See 
also Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1421-22 ("Unconstitutional conditions 
problems arise when government offers a benefit on condition that the 
recipient perform or forego an activity that a preferred constitutional right 
normally protects from government interference.").  According to Berman, 
another way of understating the doctrine is to recognize that the 
government's power to withhold a benefit entirely does not always permit it 
to offer the benefit conditionally.   See Berman, supra note 8, at 18-19.  
37 See Seth Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative 
Rights in a Positive State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1304 (1984) (observing 
that unconstitutional conditions decisions "manifest[] an inconsistency so 
marked as to make a legal realist of almost any reader.").
38 See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1421-22.  For Sullivan, “preferred 
constitutional rights” refer to rights normally protected by strict judicial 
review.  Id. at 1427.
39 See Berman, supra note 8, at 9-10 (“[U]nder Dean Sullivan's 
formulation--the conventional formulation--the question of whether this 
liberty interest rises to a constitutional right (or, as she puts it, a "preferred" 
constitutional right) determines not only whether the condition is 
unconstitutional, but whether the law even presents an unconstitutional 
conditions problem. This is unfortunate, for whether a preferred right is 
involved may prove controversial or uncertain . . . . "[P]referred rights" . . . 
do not come to our attention predefined.") (parentheses and quotations in 
original).
40
 It is true that Sullivan limits her theory "normally" to rights which 
receive strict scrutiny, see Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1427, but there does 
not appear to be any sound reason to differentiate between different forms 
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cases involving tax exemptions,41 users of public facilities,42 recipients of 
government subsidies,43 and government employees,44 and to Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendment cases involving property takings and just 
compensation.45
All that being said, the legal context in which the doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions has been applied the most often is public 
employment.  As Jason Mazzone has aptly pointed out, "[p]ublic 
employment . . . represents a constant opportunity for the government to 
persuade individuals to give up certain First Amendment protections in 
exchange for a regular paycheck."46 It is thus to a more detailed discussion 
of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine in public employment that this 
paper now turns. 
of heightened scrutiny in the unconstitutional conditions context.  This is 
not to say there are not meaningful distinctions between “mere liberty 
interests” protected by rational basis review and “constitutional rights” 
protected by some form of heightened scrutiny, or even perhaps between 
“non-preferred rights” that get some form of heightened review and 
“preferred rights” which are due strict judicial review.  Rather, assuming 
one accepts that the constitutional right involved is due some form of 
heightened review, it is unimportant for the sake of the unconstitutional 
conditions analysis whether that right is subject to "rational review with 
bite," see Paul M. Secunda, Lawrence's Quintessential Millian Moment and 
Its Impact on the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 50 VILL. L. REV.
117, 133-136 (2005), intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny.  That is, the 
relevant inquiry is whether the particular liberty interest is sufficiently 
important to the individual as to place on the government a demand for
heightened justification before it interferes with that interest.  Accord Poe v. 
Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[The liberty of 
the due process clause] . . . recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive 
judgment must, that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of 
the state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.").
41 See, e.g., Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
42 E.g. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384 (1993); and Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
43 E.g. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
44 See, e.g., Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); and Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).   
45 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); and Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
46
 Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 801, 810 
(2003).
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B.  Unconstitutional Conditions in Public Employment and the First 
Amendment
As an initial matter, in unconstitutional conditions in employment cases, 
the government has much more leeway in interfering with individual rights 
than it does when acting in the subsidy context described in the previous 
section.47  As a result, individuals in these employment cases generally have 
lesser speech and expression protections under the First Amendment.48  To 
more fully understand why this state of affairs exists in the constitutional 
public employment context, this Section proceeds by first discussing the 
unique status of the government when it acts in its employer capacity and
then next considers how this unique status has been traditionally recognized 
by the Supreme Court through the development and implementation of its 
Connick/Pickering  First Amendment analysis.  
1. The Unique Status of Government as Employer
Although most jurists once believed that government benefits, including 
public employment, were mere privileges that could be withheld or limited 
on any condition,49 the Supreme Court has now emphatically rejected "the 
greater includes the lesser" premise.50  For instance, in the landmark public 
employment case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents, the Supreme Court 
stated: "'[T]he theory that public employment which may be denied 
altogether may be subjected to any conditions, regardless of how 
47 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 1069 (2d ed. 2002).
48 See Eugene Volokh, Symposium, Intermediate Questions of Religious 
Exemptions -- A Research Agenda with Test Suites, 21 CARDOZO L. REV.
595, 635 (1999) ("Under free speech law, the government acting as 
employer has far more authority to restrict people's speech than does the 
government acting as sovereign.").
49
 While a judge on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, 
Oliver Wendell Holmes once famously said that, in the employment 
context, a person "may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has 
no constitutional right to be a policeman."  McAuliffe v. Mayor of New 
Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
50 See Mazzone, supra note 46, at 806 ("The doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions rejects the notion that the government's power to grant a benefit 
includes the lesser power to attach any conditions at all to receiving that 
benefit.").
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unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.'"51  Thus, the government "may 
not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally 
protected interests -- especially, his interest in freedom of speech."52  As the 
Court in Perry v. Sindermann aptly explained: "For if the government could 
deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected speech 
or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in effect be penalized 
and inhibited,"53 and "'produce a result which (it) could not command 
directly.'"54
Nevertheless, the public employer has been found to have more latitude 
when setting the terms and conditions of its employees' employment, a 
discretion which would not be available in its dealing with the same 
individuals as citizens.  In this regard, Justice Marshall famously stated in 
Pickering v. Bd. of Education: "[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the State has 
interests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that differ 
significantly from those it possesses in connection with regulation of the 
speech of the citizenry in general."55  Although Justice Marshall in 
Pickering did not expressly support his assertion, the Supreme Court on 
numerous occasions has since re-affirmed that government has significantly 
more authority over individuals when wearing acting in its employment  
capacity.56
51
 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 
605-06 (1967) (quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 345 F.2d 236, 239 
(2d Cir. 1965)). See also Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) 
("For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear that even though a 
person has no 'right' to a valuable governmental benefit and even though the 
government may deny him the benefit for any number of reasons, there are 
some reasons upon which the government may not rely."); and Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) ("It is too late in the day to doubt that the 
liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or 
placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege."). 
52 See Sindermann, 408 U.S. at 597.
53 Id.
54 Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
55
 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (emphasis 
added). See also Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("The restrictions that the Constitution places upon 
the government in its capacity as lawmaker, i.e., as the regulator of private 
conduct, are not the same as the restrictions it places upon the government 
in its capacity as employer.").
56 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671-72 (1994) (plurality 
opinion) ("We have never explicitly answered this question [about the 
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For example, in her opinion for the Court in Board of County 
Commissioners v. Umbehr,57 Justice O'Connor explained that, "[t]he 
government needs to be free to terminate both employees and contractors 
for poor performance, to improve the efficiency, efficacy, and 
responsiveness of service to the public, and to prevent the appearance of 
corruption."58  In a similar vein, Justice Powell explained in his concurring 
opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy that, "the Government's interest is the 
maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline . . . To this end, the 
Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over 
the management of its personnel and internal affairs."59  Finally, in Waters 
government's dual roles,] though we have always assumed that its premise 
is correct -- that the government as employer indeed has far broader powers 
that does the government as sovereign.") (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568; 
Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Nat’l Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 
(1973); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); and Bd. of Educ. of 
Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v Grumet, 512 US 687, 718 (1994) (O'Connor, 
J., concurring) ("We have ... no one Free Speech Clause test. We have 
different tests for content-based speech restrictions, for content-neutral 
speech restrictions, for restrictions imposed by the government acting as 
employer, for restrictions in nonpublic fora, and so on.")).
57
 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
58 Id. at 674; see also Waters, 511 U.S. at 674-75 (plurality opinion) 
(“[T]he extra power the government has [as employer] comes from the 
nature of the government's mission as employer.  Government agencies are 
charged by law with doing particular tasks.  Agencies hire employees to 
help do those tasks as effectively and efficiently as possible. When someone 
who is paid a salary so that she will contribute to the agency's effective 
operation begins to do or say things that detract from the agency's effective 
operation, the government employer must have some power to restrain 
her.”). See also Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative
Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225, 1250 (1999) ("The government 
has instrumental or programmatic goals within the domain of management. 
When acting there, it may restrict individual autonomy in the service of its 
programmatic goals.") (citing C. Edwin Baker, Campaign Expenditures and 
Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 16-21 (1998)).  Indeed, absent 
contractual, statutory or constitutional restriction, the government is entitled 
to terminate employees and contractors on an at-will basis, for good reason, 
bad reason, or no reason at all.  See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 674.
59
 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring).   
If it were otherwise, Justice Powell explains, the government employer 
would not be able to remove inefficient and unsatisfactory workers quickly, 
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v. Churchill, Justice O'Connor further distinguished the two differing roles 
that government undertakes by explaining that not only can certain First 
Amendment doctrines not reasonably be applied to the speech of 
government employees,60 but also by pointing to the fact that less stringent 
procedural requirements appertain to restrictions on government employees' 
speech.61
Nevertheless, while it is generally agreed that the government has more 
power to interfere with individuals' constitutional rights in its employment 
capacity,62 it is has been difficult to give dimension to the exact amount of 
disruption employee speech or conduct must cause before the government 
employer can intervene.63   The next section turns to this difficult question.   
2. The First Amendment Speech and Expression Rights of Public  
Employees: The Connick/Pickering Analysis 
To determine whether the government employer is acting in a 
"reasonable" manner, and consistent with other constitutional contexts 
involving "reasonableness" tests,64 the Supreme Court has engaged in a 
and the government's substantial  interest in so doing would be frustrated 
without adequate justification.  Id.
60 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 672 (plurality opinion) (reviewing a number 
of First Amendment doctrines that do not apply with the same force in the 
government as employer context, including instances in which the employer 
"may bar its employees from using Mr. Cohen's offensive utterance to 
members of the public or to the people with whom they work.") (citing 
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971)).
61 See id. at 673 (observing that although speech restrictions on private 
citizens must precisely define the speech they target, a government 
employer is permitted to prohibit its employees from acting "rude to 
customers," even though this restriction would be void for vagueness under 
traditional First Amendment jurisprudence); see also Volokh, supra note 
48, at 635.  
62 See Waters, 511 U.S. at 673 (observing that the Court has 
"consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm 
used to justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm 
used to justify restrictions on the speech of the public at large.").
63 See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150 (1983) (noting the difficulty 
associated with the Pickering balance).
64 See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342-43 (1985)  
(balancing test utilized to show reasonableness in Fourth Amendment 
government search of public school student's purse); see also infra Part 
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constitutional balancing act.65  In this regard, Justice Marshall set forth the 
applicable test in Pickering: "The problem in any case is to arrive at a 
balance between the interests of the [public employee], as citizen, in 
commenting upon matters of public concern and interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees."66  This principle applies regardless of the public 
employee's contractual or other claims to a job.67
Important considerations in carrying out this balance include whether 
the employee's statements would impair discipline by superiors, harmony 
among co-workers, close working relationships for which personal loyalty 
and confidence are necessary, the performance of the employee's duties, or 
the regular operation of the enterprise.68  In Pickering, for instance, the 
balancing came out in favor of the public school teacher since the statement 
concerned a matter of public concern (i.e., whether the school system 
required additional funds), and there was no evidence that the statement 
disrupted the employee's relationship with co-workers, his own job duties, 
or with the operation of the school in general.69   In such instances, the 
Court found that, "it is necessary to regard the [public employee] as the 
member of the general public he seeks to be."70
The Pickering balancing test, however, was given an important, and 
IV.B.2 (discussing in detail the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test as 
applied to government employees).
65 See Bd. of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996).
66 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).  
67 See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972).  In this sense, 
First Amendment claims based on the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions are distinct from procedural due process claims which depend on 
whether the public employee is thought to have a liberty or property interest 
in his or her employment.  See id. at 599.
68
 Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing Pickering, 
391 U.S.  at 570-73).
69 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571-72.  The Court also noted the import of 
allowing public employees to speak out on matters of public concern since 
they are many times in the best position to have "informed and definite 
opinions."  See id. at 572.
70 See id. at 574.  Of course, regarding the public employee "as the 
member of the general public he seeks to be," does not mean that 
government employees qualify for the more stringent protections that apply 
to citizens when the government acts in its sovereign capacity.  See supra
Part II.B.1.
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ambiguous, gloss in 1983 in the case of Connick v. Myers.71  Although the 
phrasing, "a matter of public concern" was included in the Court's 
formulation in Pickering,72 Connick elaborated upon what counts as "a 
matter of public concern."73   In Connick, an assistant district attorney had 
circulated to co-workers a questionnaire concerning internal office affairs in 
order to discover whether there was a general job satisfaction problem in 
the New Orleans District Attorney's office.74  Emphasizing "the common 
sense realization that government offices could not function if every 
employment decision became a constitutional matter,"75 the Court ruled that 
even before a Pickering balance could occur, a court had to consider as a 
threshold matter whether the public employee was speaking on a “matter of 
public concern.”76   The Court made the public concern test the center of 
this crucial inquiry based on its belief that all previous unconstitutional 
conditions in employment cases centered on “the rights of public employees 
to participate in public affairs.”77 Because the Court concluded that most of 
the questionnaire concerned matters of "private interest," rather than "public 
concern,"78 it dismissed most of the plaintiff's First Amendment claim at 
71
 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
72 See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
73 See Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to 
Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L. J. 43, 47-50 
(1988).
74 Connick, 461 U.S. at 140-41.
75 Id. at 143.
76
 Id. at 146 ("Pickering, its antecedents and progeny, lead us to 
conclude that if [the] questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as 
constituting speech on a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to 
scrutinize the reasons for her discharge.").     
77 Id.  at 144-45.  Justice White explained for the majority that, "When 
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of 
political, social, or other concern to the community, government officials 
should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive 
oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment."  Id. at 146.
78 Id. at 154. The Court went out of its way to emphasize that public 
employee speech on private matters does not constitute unprotected speech 
such as obscenity or fighting words.  See id. at 147. Nevertheless, "when a 
public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but 
instead as an employee upon matters only of personal interest, absent the 
most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in 
which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public 
agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior."  Id. 
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this threshold level.79
While Connick explained the centrality of the public concern test to the 
public employee free speech analysis, it provided little guidance as to how 
to draw the lines between what is "a matter of public concern" and what is a 
"matter of private interest."80  All that Connick stated in this regard was 
that, "[w]hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern 
must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, 
as revealed by the whole record."81  Consequently, Connick has left us with 
"tenuous determinations about which matters are of public concern and ad 
hoc, case-by- case balancing of governmental efficiency interests against 
employee speech interests."82
79 Id. at 154. As for the one question on the questionnaire which could 
be characterized as a matter of public concern, the Court found that because 
of the disruptive effect of this question on the workplace, the Pickering 
balance came out in favor of the government. Id.  As Randy Kozel has aptly 
commented, this disruption theory of public employee speech is unsettling 
because "[s]uch a test is inconsistent with the notion of robust exchange of 
divergent ideas, as it leaves vulnerable the speech that is most likely to have 
a strong effect."  See Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing Public Employee 
Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1018 (2005).
80
 One issue that has been decided about the public concern test since 
Connick, however, is that a statement made by a public employee in a 
private conversation criticizing a political official may still be considered 
speech on a matter of "public" concern.  See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 
U.S. 378, 386-7 (1987); see also Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. 
Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415-16 (1979) (holding that a public employee may 
express her views in private to an employer and still be protected by the 
First Amendment). 
81 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
82
 Kozel, supra note 79, at 1017.  It is therefore not surprising that a 
veritable cottage industry of academic literature has attempted to make 
sense of this amorphous, unsatisfying test.  See, e.g., id. at 1044-51 (putting 
forth an internal/external model of public employee speech to replace 
current Connick/Pickering approach); Allred, supra note 73, at 75-81 
(describing the conflict and confusion surrounding the public concern test 
and proposing an alternative standard); Paul Cerkvenik, Note, Who Your
Friends Are Could Get You Fired! The Connick "Public Concern" Test 
Unjustifiably Restricts Public Employees' Associational Rights, 79 MINN. L. 
REV. 425, 445 (1994) (discussing confusion surrounding whether the public 
concern test applies to public employee freedom of association cases); 
Karin B. Hoppmann, Note, Concern with Public Concern: Toward a Better 
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Nevertheless, it appears that the substantial legal hurdles imposed by 
Connick become much more manageable for public employees in a sub-set 
of cases in which the employee speech is completely unrelated to his or her 
public employment and is spoken on the employee's own time, but still 
qualifies as a matter of public concern.83  In United States v. National 
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU),84 the federal government passed a law 
prohibiting federal employees from receiving honoraria for making 
speeches or writing articles.85  Significantly, the prohibition applied even 
though the subject of the article did not have any connection to the 
government employee’s employment.86
Definition of the Pickering/Connick Threshold Test, 50 VAND. L. REV. 993, 
996 (1997) (stating that the Connick Court failed to supply a clear definition 
of public concern and that the test is flawed); Kermit Roosevelt III, Note, 
The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment in the 
Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1241 (1997) (criticizing the 
vagueness of the public concern test); and D. Gordon Smith, Comment, 
Beyond "Public Concern": New Free Speech Standards for Public 
Employees, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 255-64 (1990) (contending that 
problems surrounding the public concern test have led to undue restriction 
of the free speech rights of public employees).  Additionally, the Supreme 
Court has slated for argument yet another case for the October 2005 Term 
dealing with this enigmatic issue.  See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 361 F.3d 1168 
(9th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 125 S. Ct. 1395 (Feb. 25, 2005) (posing the 
question of whether a public employee's purely job-related speech should be 
cloaked with First Amendment protection if it touches upon a matter of 
public concern).  
83
 Indeed, as early as Connick, the Court recognized that different 
factors might be at play when the public employee speech involves off-
duty, non-work related activities.  See Connick, 461 U.S. at 153 n.13 (citing 
NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322 (1974)). 
84
 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
85 Id. at 457.
86 Id.  Examples of the plaintiffs’ speeches in this case include a mail 
handler who wanted to give lectures on the Quaker religion, an aerospace 
engineer who lectured on black history, and a microbiologist who wrote 
articles on dance performances.  See id.  at 461-62.  Importantly, the Court 
noted that these federal employees sought compensation for their expressive 
activities in their capacity as citizens, not as government employees, and 
these activities did not have any adverse impact on the efficiency of the 
offices in which they worked. Id. at 465 ("Neither the character of the 
authors, the subject matter of their expression, the effect of the content of 
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Finding that the federal employees' expressive activities fell within the 
category of comment on matters of public concern,87 the Court was able to 
conclude easily under Pickering that the employees' interests outweighed 
those of the government.88   More interestingly, the Court appears to be 
saying that even when speech is completely unrelated to a public 
employee's job, the public concern test is still the appropriate test to apply.89
their expression on their official duties, nor the kind of audiences they 
address have any relevance to their employment.").
87 See id. at 466 ("Respondents' expressive activities in this case fall 
within the protected category of citizen comment on matters of public 
concern rather than employee comment on matters related to personal status 
in the workplace. The speeches and articles for which they received 
compensation in the past were addressed to a public audience, were made 
outside the workplace, and involved content largely unrelated to their 
government employment.").  Interestingly, the dichotomy seemingly set up 
by the Court in NTEU does not contemplate whether a government 
employer can fire an employee for engaging in conduct outside of work not 
addressed to a public audience and not on matters of public concern, such as 
the situation where a public employee is fired for writing poetry on their 
own time.  A literal reading of Connick and NTEU would suggest that the 
poetry-writing employee would have no constitutional protection, a 
seemingly absurd result.  Such an employee might be protected, however, 
under the proposed modified Pickering test for post-Lawrence substantive 
due process rights.  See infra discussion Parts IV.B, V.B. (The author 
particularly wishes to thank Mitch Berman for his insights on the issues 
discussed in this footnote).  
88
 Furthermore, when Congress seeks to deter in a wholesale fashion a 
broad category of expression, the burden on the government will be 
especially heavy.  See id. at 467; see also id. at 468 ("The widespread 
impact of the honoraria ban . . . gives rise to far more serious concerns than
could any single supervisory decision.").  The Court also found that a 
prohibition on compensation for speech, rather than on the speech itself, 
could cause just as much of a burden on an employee's expressive activity.  
See id. at 468.
89 Accord Kozel, supra note 79, at 1050-51 (observing that when the 
employee speech in question includes "indicia of the speaker's employment, 
the proper analytical rubric [is] the familiar Connick/Pickering two- step).  
See also NTEU, 513 U.S. at 480 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) 
("The time-tested Pickering balance . . . provides the governing framework 
for analysis of all manner of restrictions on speech by the government as 
employer.").
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In other words, even when a public employee is acting in her capacity as a 
citizen, under the First Amendment analysis, that employee is still treated as 
a government employee if the speech restriction is predicated upon the 
individual's public employment.90
C.      The Peculiar Lack of Unconstitutional Conditions In Employment 
Cases Outside of the First Amendment
As can be gathered from the intricate legal analysis described above, the 
Supreme Court has spent a substantial amount of time working out the 
contours of the First Amendment speech rights of public employees.  The 
same cannot be said of the parameters of public employees' constitutional 
rights outside of the First Amendment.  Although such cases do exist (most 
at the lower federal court level with one exception),91 the Court continues to 
90
 A possible alternative view would have permitted the employee, when 
speaking as a citizen, to take advantage of the more stringent protections of 
the traditional First Amendment analysis.  See Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("When public employees engage in expression 
unrelated to their employment while away from the work place, their First 
Amendment rights are, of course, no different from those of the general 
public.").  
91 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976) (upholding hair 
length regulations for police officers under substantive due process, noting, 
"If such state regulations may survive challenges based on the explicit 
language of the First Amendment, there is surely even more room for 
restrictive regulations of state employees where the claim implicates only 
the more general contours of the substantive liberty interest protected by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.").  Many more of these cases have percolated 
through the lower federal courts throughout the years, without much success 
for public employee plaintiffs.  See, e.g., Akers v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d 
1030, 1040-41 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that anti-fraternization rule not 
allowing prison employees to associate with offenders off-duty did not 
violate employee's freedom of intimate association); Shahar v. Bowers, 114 
F.3d 1097, 1110 (11th Cir. 1997) (rehearing en banc) (upholding discharge 
of staff attorney of the Georgia Department of Law who was fired when 
employer learned of planned homosexual marriage ceremony); Rathert v. 
Vill. of Peotone, 903 F.2d 510, 515 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that prohibiting 
police officers from wearing earring off-duty rationally related to 
permissible purpose). See also Steve Hartsoe, ACLU Challenges N.C. 
Cohabitation Law, WASH. POST, May 10, 2005, at A06 (describing ACLU 
lawsuit filed against Pender County, North Carolina for forcing a sheriff 
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apply mostly the government-as-employer analysis in the First Amendment 
context.92
Of the few cases that do exist, some have been highlighted by Justice 
Scalia in his dissent in Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., a political 
affiliation case.93  For instance, in the Fourth Amendment context, Justice 
Scalia noted that although private citizens were not subjected to 
governmental searches and seizures of their property without a warrant 
supported by probable cause, government employees, in many 
circumstances, may have their property searched without violating the 
Fourth Amendment.94  Additionally, governmental entities may more easily 
conduct drug testing of public employees who are engaged in safety 
sensitive or confidential positions.95  This is because "in certain limited 
circumstances, the Government's need to discover such latent or hidden 
conditions, or to prevent their development, is sufficiently compelling to 
justify the intrusion on privacy entailed by conducting such searches 
without any measure of individualized suspicion."96  Scalia also noted in his 
Rutan dissent that, in the Fifth Amendment context, private citizens cannot 
be forced to provide the government with information that incriminates 
them, but government employees can be dismissed from employment when 
the incriminating information in question is related to the performance of 
dispatcher to quit her job for violating state's "adultery and fornication" 
law).
92 See Mazzone, supra note 46, at 810 (noting that, "[t]he doctrine of 
unconstitutional conditions has been most vigorously applied in First 
Amendment cases.").
93 See Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 94 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976) 
(upholding a hair grooming regulation for police under substantive due 
process finding a clear rational connection between the regulation and the 
promotion of safety of persons and property)).
94 See id. (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 723 (1987) 
(plurality opinion)).
95 See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656, 667-668 (1989) (permitting drug testing of federal custom agents who 
interdict drugs or carry weapons); and Knox County Educ. Ass’n. v. Knox 
County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361, 384 (6th Cir. 1998) (upholding a policy 
of suspicionless drug testing for all individuals who apply for, transfer to, or 
are promoted to, "safety sensitive" positions within a school system, 
including teaching positions).
96 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668.
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their jobs.97  Finally, in the substantive due process area pre-Lawrence, 
public employers historically could regulate such things as their police 
officers' grooming practices.98
Although some public employment cases involving interests under the 
substantive due process clause have been argued at the lower federal court 
level,99 mostly absent from Supreme Court jurisprudence is any mention of 
the relationship between public employment and interests under substantive 
due process.100  The lack of unconstitutional conditions in employment 
cases outside of the First Amendment is puzzling, but will perhaps become 
an anachronism with the additional emphasis being placed on interests in 
decisional autonomy in light of Lawrence v. Texas.101
Consistent with this line of thought, the next section argues that recent 
developments in substantive due process law, ushered in by the Supreme 
Court's decision in Lawrence, should lead to a new approach to 
unconstitutional conditions cases involving the interests of public 
employees in decisional non-interference in private affairs.  It is to that task 
that this paper now turns.
97 See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 94-95 (citing Gardner v. Broderick, 392 U.S. 
273, 277-78 (1968)).
98 See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247.
99 See supra note 91.
100
 Although Kelley v. Johnson did involve the application of 
substantive due process to an unconstitutional condition in public 
employment case, see supra note 20, it only applied a pre-Lawrence, 
traditional rational basis review analysis.  See Kelley, 425 U.S. at 247-48.  
In fact, the Supreme Court failed to grant certiorari in two cases concerning 
the right to decisional non-interference in private affairs in the early 1980s.   
See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., Montgomery County, Ohio, 
470 U.S. 1009, 1011 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari) (describing case upholding the firing of a public high school 
teacher who was fired for the mere fact of being bisexual); and Whisenhunt 
v. Spradlin, 464 U.S. 965, 971 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (discussing case upholding the firing of male police sergeant 
and female patrol office for engaging together in a romantic relationship).  
101
 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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III. LAWRENCE AND THE RIGHT TO DECISIONAL NON-INTERFERENCE IN 
PRIVATE AFFAIRS
A.  The Various Incomplete Incarnations of the Right to Decisional Non-
Interference Prior to Lawrence v. Texas
Since Brandeis and Warren wrote their famous article in 1890 about 
privacy rights,102 the only thing that commentators seem to agree on 
concerning the right to privacy is that there is very little agreement about its 
contours.103  It is not my goal here to suggest a theory or taxonomy of 
privacy.104  Rather, this section discusses the interest in decisional non-
interference in private affairs, and the various labels and methods which 
courts have utilized to protect these decisional autonomy rights prior to 
Lawrence.105  Specifically, this section categorizes the various approaches 
to decisional non-interference as part of the jurisprudences of: (1) the right 
to be let alone; (2) the right to personhood; and (3) the right to intimacy or 
intimate association.
1. The Right to Be Let Alone
The place to start this discussion, as always, must be with the seminal 
Brandeis and Warren article,106 for prior to this time the Court only 
recognized constitutional privacy rights stemming directly from concrete 
and explicit constitutional provisions that addressed privacy concerns in 
102 See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
103 See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1087, 1099-1124 (2002) (cataloging the different conceptions of privacy 
that various courts and commentators have championed).
104
 For a recent attempt at a pragmatic theory of privacy, see, e.g,, id. at 
1090-1091 (developing a theory of privacy based on Wittgenstein's notion 
of "family resemblance").   
105
 Here, I rely upon Solove's taxonomy for privacy for the different 
types of decisional non-interference.  See id. at 1092; see also Solove, supra 
note 14, at 54-57 (under this more recent contextual taxonomy offered by 
Solove, a violation of these type of "privacy rights" would be referred to as 
"decisional interference in private affairs").  Each of these categories, 
however, is not mutually exclusive and relies upon one another to varying 
degree under difference conceptions of privacy.  See Solove, supra note 
103, at 1116.
106 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102.
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particular contexts,107 and then only rarely.  Brandeis and Warren talked of 
privacy generally as "a right to be let alone" by the government.108  To 
them, and to us today no less, there was a sphere of personal autonomy or 
"personality" upon which the government should not be able to tread 
arbitrarily.109  Of course, this very idea of the unencumbered individual 
sprang directly from more generic forms of classical liberalism.110  In turn, 
107
 Such individual constitutional provisions recognized prior to 1890 
included the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizures under 
the Fourth Amendment, and the right not to be forced to incriminate oneself 
under the Fifth Amendment.  See, e.g., Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 
633 (1886):
For the 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the 
fourth amendment are almost always made for the purpose of 
compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in 
criminal cases is condemned in the fifth amendment; and 
compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness against 
himself,' which is condemned in the fifth amendment, throws light 
on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' 
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.
108 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 102, at 193.  Although the 
Supreme Court utilized this definition of privacy a number of times shortly 
after the article, see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) 
(concerning the right to bodily integrity with regard to a compulsory 
vaccination law); and Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 
(1891) (stating that a person had the right to be let alone where the issue 
was whether a plaintiff could be forced to undergo a surgical examination), 
the references to a "right to be let alone" in Supreme Court jurisprudence 
were relatively rare until after the Second World War.  
109 See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 106, at 205-206 (noting that 
privacy was based on the principle "of inviolate personality" and that there 
is "a general right to privacy for thoughts, emotions, and sensations"); and 
Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1052 (contending that American life is animated 
by a presumptive libertarian mentality: "Libertarian is the presumption that 
the state leaves us alone to choose our own path to happiness.").  See also 
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (holding that individuals have 
the “fundamental . . . right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, 
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one’s privacy.”). 
110
 By classical liberalism, I simply mean a political philosophy which 
endorses a conception of liberty as the absence of interference.  See Isaiah 
Berlin, Inaugural Address Before the University of Oxford (Oct. 31, 1958), 
in ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, IN LIBERALISM AND ITS 
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classical liberalism finds its root in John Stuart Mill's On Liberty111 and its 
most vivid expression in Justice Brandeis' dissent in Olmstead v. United 
States: 
The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They 
recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his 
feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of 
the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in 
material things. They sought to protect Americans in their 
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. 
They conferred, as against the government, the right to be 
let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the right 
most valued by civilized men.112
All that being said, the right to be let alone did not gain substantial 
traction in constitutional thought until after World War II.113  Indeed, earlier 
cases had been generally abysmal with regard to individual autonomy and 
dignity, as can be no better demonstrated than by Justice Holmes’ infamous 
1927 opinion in Buck v. Bell regarding the necessary sterilization of 
"imbeciles."114
Although there were some fits and starts, the crucial break in the 
constitutional levee came in the landmark case of Griswold v. 
Connecticut.115  In Griswold, the Court located a constitutional right to 
privacy within the penumbras of the Bill of Rights.116  Suffice it to say that 
CRITICS 118, 131 (1969). 
111 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 118 and n.2 (discussing JOHN STUART 
MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., Norton Critical Editions 1975) (1859)).
112
 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).
113
 As one indicia of its increasing presence, the "right to be let alone" 
language was utilized only three times prior to 1946, but forty-three times 
since according to a recent Westlaw query. 
114
 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding compulsory 
sterilization legislation as constitutional, stating that, "[t]hree generations of 
imbeciles are enough").
115
  381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
116 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 ("The foregoing cases suggest that 
specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by 
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance."). 
See also id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (locating the right to privacy 
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this case's recognition of constitutionally-recognized zones of privacy, 
unhinged from any one constitutional anchor, dramatically changed the 
Court's orientation concerning individual rights to be free from arbitrary 
government interference.117  Although Griswold itself only struck down 
anti-contraception laws for married couples,118 its greater import derived 
from its rooting the right to be let alone within the very structure and fiber 
of the Federal Constitution.119
Consequently, it could not be considered surprising when, thereafter, the 
right recognized in Griswold was extended to some non-married individuals 
in Eisenstadt v. Baird120 and to additional individuals under the age of 16 in 
Carey v. Population Services International.121  And not only was this zone 
of privacy found to exist in the sacred quarters of the marital bedroom,122 it 
was also decisively extended to more transcendental spheres with the 
recognition of a woman's right to choose whether to terminate her 
pregnancy in Roe v. Wade.123  Indeed, Roe decisively located these rights 
in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of certain fundamental rights to the 
people); and id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring) (finding the privacy right as 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty") (citing Palko v. Connecticut, 
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).  But see Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 605-
06 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (maintaining that there is no general 
right to privacy in the United States Constitution). 
117 See Robert Misner, Minimalism, Desuetude, and Fornication, 35 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 25-26 (1999) (discussing the impact of the 
Griswold decision on constitutional privacy law). 
118
 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
119 Id. at 485 ("The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying 
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional 
guarantees."). 
120
  405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
121
  431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
122
 For a discussion of the importance of the conception of the home to 
historical constitutional privacy jurisprudence pre-Lawrence, see discussion 
infra note 165 and accompanying text.  See also Marc Stein, Boutilier and 
the U.S. Supreme Court's Sexual Revolution, 23 LAW & HISTORY REV. 491, 
535 (2005) (maintaining that based on its rulings from 1965 to 1973, "the 
[United States Supreme] Court's vision of sexual citizenship was not 
libertarian or egalitarian . . . [, but] was based on a doctrine that privileged 
adult, heterosexual, monogamous, marital, familial, domestic, private, and 
procreative forms of sexual expression.").
123
 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) ("[A] right of personal privacy, or a 
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the 
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within the liberty interest contained in the substantive component of the 
Due Process Clause of the 5th and 14th Amendments.124
2. The Right to Personhood: Individuality, Dignity, and Autonomy
But the Court has not only sought to describe an individual's right to be 
free from arbitrary government interference by merely relying upon Justice 
Brandeis' vivid language in Olmstead concerning the "right to be let alone."  
It has also done so in those substantive due process cases which see the 
essence of this right revolving around personhood, or more specifically, as 
involving themes of individuality, dignity, and autonomy.125  As Solove has 
explained, basing privacy on conceptions of personhood differs from other 
conceptions of privacy because personhood conceptions focus on the 
normative good "of the protection of the integrity of the personality."126
Griswold, Eisenstadt, Carey, and Roe all have at their core this conception 
of privacy.127  In a similar vein, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court emphatically 
Constitution.").
124 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.  In line with locating these rights within 
the substantive component of the Due Process Clause, Justice Harlan 
famously wrote in another case: 
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process 
Clause cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the 
specific guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This 
'liberty' is not a series of isolated points picked out in terms of 
the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; 
the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable 
searches and seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum 
which, broadly speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial 
arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints . . . and which 
also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, 
that certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the 
state needs asserted to justify their abridgment.
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (internal 
citations omitted).
125 See Solove, supra note 103, at 1116-1119.
126 Id. at 1116.
127 Id. at 1117 ("[T]hese cases involved decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing.").  
Indeed, this line of substantive due process cases pre-dates even the 
Olmstead dissent.  See Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy Names of 
Jesus & Mary, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding that the interest of parents in 
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stated that the government is not free to interfere with an individual’s 
fundamental life decisions without sufficient justification.128
Perhaps the most "elegant encapsulation"129 of this view of privacy as 
personhood was captured by the joint opinion of Justices O'Connor, Souter, 
and Kennedy in the pivotal 1992 case of Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.130  In the now famous "sweet-mystery-
of-life" passage, derided by Justice Scalia and other commentators,131 these 
three Justices found that: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal 
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to 
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of 
liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, 
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human 
life.132
being able to send their children to private school to inhere within 
substantive due process); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) 
(holding that the Constitution's protection of liberty encompasses the 
interest of parents in having their children learn German).
128 See Whalen, 429 U.S. at 599-600; see also Solove, supra note 103, at 
1117 ("[T]he Court has conceptualized the protection of privacy as the 
state's non-interference in certain decisions that are essential in defining 
personhood.").
129 See Robert E. Toone, The Incoherence of Defendant Autonomy, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 621, 655-656 (2005) (citing Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
130
 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
131
 For examples of Justice Scalia's and other commentators distaste of 
this phrasing, see, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Dwight G. Duncan, The Federal Marriage 
Amendment and Rule By Judges, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 543 (2004); 
James E. Fleming, Lawrence's Republic, 39 TULSA L. REV. 563 (2004); see 
also Toone, supra note 129, at 655-656 (remarking that Justice Scalia's 
derision notwithstanding, many have found the 'right to define one's own 
concept of existence' formulation to be valuable).
132 Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (Joint Opinion of Justices O'Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter) (emphasis added).  It is significant to note that the 
Casey joint opinion did not receive majority support in placing this type of 
all-encompassing liberty squarely within the substantive component of the 
due process clauses. Indeed, this conception based on individual autonomy 
and dignity remained a minority view of the Court until Lawrence.  See
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Nevertheless, prior to Lawrence, the scope of the personhood rights 
recognized by the joint opinion in Casey appeared to be largely limited by 
the "history and tradition" test of Washington v. Glucksberg, a case dealing 
with the right to physician-assisted suicide.133  There, the Court appeared to 
draw back from the broad conception of individual liberty from 
governmental interference set forth by the Casey plurality.  In Glucksberg, 
the Court found that the State of Washington's ban on assisted suicide did 
not violate the due process rights of individuals because such laws were 
rationally related to a legitimate government purpose.134  In denying that 
such laws interfered with the fundamental rights of individuals, the Court 
employed a substantive due process analysis which considered whether 
there was a careful description of an asserted right that was one of "those 
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in the 
Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, 
such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed."135
Finding that such a right to physician-assisted suicide was not so enshrined 
in our nation's history, the Court found there was no fundamental right to 
assisted suicide under due process and upheld the Washington ban of 
physician-assisted suicide under rational basis review.136  Consequently, as 
late as 1997, far from embracing the comprehensive notion of individual 
liberty to be free from governmental interference embodied by Casey, the 
Supreme Court in Glucksberg appeared to be in the process of substantially 
narrowing the scope of its substantive due process jurisprudence.137
Secunda, supra note 40, at 135 n.84.
133
 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
134 Id. at 733.
135 Id. at 720-21 (internal citations omitted).
136 Id. at 721.  As I have argued in a previous article, this stultifying 
view of the contours of substantive due process has been criticized by 
Justices and commentators as inconsistent with a broader and more 
appropriate view of freedom from governmental interference.  See Secunda, 
supra note 40, at 129 n.52.
137 Accord Note, Assessing the Viability of a Substantive Due Process 
Right to In Vitro Fertilization, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2792, 2798 (2005) 
("Glucksberg's 'careful description' test reflected the Court's tendency, 
evinced in prior cases, toward narrow definition of the right in question as a 
means of checking the expansion of the Court's substantive due process 
jurisprudence."). 
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3. The Right to Intimacy and Intimate Association
Closely connected to the right of personhood is the right to intimacy or 
intimate association.  Not only did the plurality in the "sweet-mystery-of-
life" passage of Casey utilize the word "intimate" to assist in defining the 
constitutional interests at stake,138 but almost a decade earlier in Roberts v. 
U.S. Jaycees,139 the Court recognized an important distinction between First 
Amendment rights of expressive association140 and rights of intimate 
association under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.141   The 
latter rights recognize "that, because the Bill of Rights is designed to secure 
individual liberty, it must afford the formation and preservation of certain 
kinds of highly personal relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary 
from unjustified interference by the State."142  The Roberts Court defined a 
central aspect of an individual's freedom from decisional non-interference in 
private, intimate association as the ability to form and maintain human 
bonds unmolested by the State, concluding that, "[p]rotecting these 
[intimate] relationships from unwarranted state interference . . . safeguards 
the ability independently to define one's identity that is central to any 
concept of liberty."143
  Despite Roberts' strong endorsement of a right to intimate association, 
138 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (Joint Opinion of Justices O'Connor, 
Kennedy, and Souter).
139
 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
140
 For a discussion of the relationship between expressive association 
and right to decisional non-interference in private affairs, see infra notes 
229-230 and accompanying text.  See also generally Daniel A. Farber, 
Speaking in the First Person Plural: Expressive Associations and the First 
Amendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483 (2001).
141 See id. at 618.
142 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 
U.S. 510, 534-535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)); 
and id. at 619 ("Moreover, the constitutional shelter afforded such 
relationships reflects the realization that individuals draw much of their 
emotional enrichment from close ties with others.").  The citation to these 
older cases clearly places the freedom to intimate association within 
substantive due process jurisprudence, rather than the First Amendment.
143 Id. at 619.  Indeed, as Solove has explained, the important distinction 
between the liberty of personhood versus the liberty of intimacy is the 
difference between self-creation and autonomy on the one hand, and the 
importance of human relationships to all individuals on the other.  See
Solove, supra note 103, at 1121.
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prior to Lawrence, at least one significant Supreme Court case, Bowers v. 
Hardwick,144 appeared to discount the importance of such human 
relationships.  Bowers held, of cour se, that there is no constitutional right to 
engage in homosexual sodomy.145  Through Justice White's narrow 
conception of the individual interest involved in Bowers as pure sexual 
gratification through the act of anal or oral intercourse in a homosexual 
relationship, the Court limited the scope of the liberty interest found in the 
Due Process Clause;146 that is, it failed to recognize that meaningful 
personal relationships are necessarily made up of both sexual and non-
sexual dimensions, all for the larger individual pursuit of happiness.147
Consequently, prior to June 2003, there was no comprehensive 
conception of decisional autonomy in private affairs which recognized an 
individual's right to self-definition, as well as his or her right to engage in 
the process of self-definition through the development of personal 
relationships with others.  And to the extent that such a right to decisional 
non-interference in private affairs was recognized, as it was in the 1977 case 
of Whalen v. Roe,148 it did not seem to be afforded any type of heightened 
protection from governmental incursions.  Finally, although this type of 
liberty interest has been recognized to some degree in past Supreme Court 
cases, the Court continued to struggle to define the more esoteric and non-
material aspects of these liberty interests. 
B.  Lawrence v. Texas and the Fulfillment of Olmstead’s Legacy
The Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas149 greatly changed 
the substantive due process jurisprudential landscape.  Lawrence's central 
holding, that the Texas sodomy statute at issue furthered no legitimate state 
interest which could justify its intrusion into the personal and private lives 
144
 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 
(2003).
145 Id. at 190-91.
146 See Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1032 (denominating Justice White's 
opinion for the Court "brusque" and "limit[ing] the Court's previous privacy 
precedents to situations unique to heterosexual couples (marriage, 
procreation, family).").
147 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) ("The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure 
conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the 
significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect.").
148
  429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).  
149
 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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of the individuals therein,150 was the first time a majority of the Supreme 
Court unabashedly accepted in one case a conception of liberty that 
included an individual's rights to be let alone, to personhood, and to 
intimacy.151  In particular, by expressly overruling Bowers152 and, to a lesser 
extent, by failing to even mention Glucksberg as binding precedent,153 the 
Supreme Court put forward a novel type of substantive due process 
analysis.154  Even though Lawrence clearly relied on Griswold, Roe, and 
Casey, in coming to its conclusion,155 the key additional step taken by 
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence was to recognize a transcendental, 
non-material aspect to these types of liberty interests, consistent with the 
Olmstead and Poe dissents of bygone days.156
150 Id. at 578.  See also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1056 (reading the 
underlying message of Lawrence and Romer as: "The state cannot create a 
pariah class of useful, productive citizens and deny them a broad range of 
legal rights and protections simply because their presumed private activities 
are disgusting to other citizens.").  
151
 Although a similar conception of decisional autonomy in private 
affairs was considered in Casey, it was not adopted by a majority of the 
court.  See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
152 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
153 See Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The Fundamental Right 
That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004)
(maintaining that “the [Lawrence] Court gave short shrift to the notion that 
it was under some obligation to confine its implementation of substantive 
due process to the largely mechanical exercise of isolating ‘fundamental 
rights’ as though they were a historically given set of data points on a two 
dimensional grid.”).
154 Accord Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court 2002 Term, Foreword: 
Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 97 (2003) ("Themes of respect and stigma are at the moral center of 
the Lawrence opinion, and they are entirely new to substantive due process 
doctrine.").
155 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564-66.  See also Eskridge, supra note 15, at 
1012 ("Once cannot interpret or apply Lawrence without situating it in 
history."). 
156 See id. at 562 ("Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty 
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, 
expression, and certain intimate conduct. The instant case involves liberty 
of the person both in its spatial and in its more transcendent dimensions."). 
See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); 
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., 
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My purpose here, however, is not to undertake an extensive analysis of 
what Lawrence does and does not hold.  I have already weighed in on that 
debate,157 and it will no doubt continue to percolate, at least until the 
Supreme Court takes another case discussing the scope of its Lawrence 
holding.158  Rather, my enterprise in this section is much more modest.  I 
merely wish to emphasize a point on which most commentators on all sides 
of the debate seem to agree; that is, Lawrence attaches some form of 
heightened review when the government seeks to interfere with the private 
and personal lives of individuals.159  Although it is true that various forms 
dissenting).
157 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 125-136 (maintaining that Lawrence
court applied a rational review with bite scrutiny in overturning the Texas 
sodomy statute); accord State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 30, 34 (Kan. 2005) 
(finding that the Lawrence majority, by discussing the equal protection 
analysis in Romer and by discussing the inevitably linked nature of equal 
protection and due process analysis in cases such as these, “at least implied 
that the rational basis test is the appropriate standard.”).
158 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 162.
159 See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, An "Other" Christian Perspective on 
Lawrence, 45 J. CATH. LEG. STUDS. (forthcoming 2006) (on file with 
author) (finding that the Lawrence Court’s use of "rational basis" refers to 
"rational basis with bite" because the evidence in the case suggests 
irrational discrimination or animus) (citing Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In 
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer 
Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-24 (1972)); Marybeth Herald, A 
Bedroom of One's Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. 
Texas, 16 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 29-32 (2004) (arguing that Lawrence is 
an "elegant discourse on individual autonomy and liberty" and that some 
form of heightened review is involved); Nan D. Hunter, Symposium: Gay 
Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, Living With Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV.
1103, 1104 (2004) (reading Lawrence to extend meaningful constitutional 
protection to liberty interests without denominating them fundamental 
rights); Martin A. Schwartz, Constitutional Basis of "Lawrence v. Texas,” 
10/14/2003 N.Y.L.J. 3 (col. 1) (concluding that the Lawrence Court relied 
on "important low-level scrutiny”); id. (describing Professor Dorf's 
argument that Justice Kennedy's reliance on decisions like Griswold and 
Roe, may imply that the court intended some form of heightened scrutiny); 
and Tribe, supra note 153, at 1899 (arguing that the Court in Lawrence 
“implicitly reject[ed] the notion that its task was simply to name the specific 
activities textually or historically treated as protected,” and treated the 
doctrine of substantive due process as reflecting “a deeper pattern involving 
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of heightened scrutiny, including strict scrutiny, have been applied in the 
past with regard to specific rights within the context of the rights to be let 
alone, to personhood, and to intimate association, this article makes the 
crucial point that Lawrence represents the first time a majority of the Court 
has recognized a comprehensive preferred interest in decisional non-
interference in private affairs.160   And as a preferred interest, governmental 
infringements of an individual’s interests in decisional non-interference in 
private affairs must involve the balancing of governmental efficiency 
concerns against an individual’s interest in being free from governmental 
interference in her personal and private life.161  Indeed, this is the very same 
balancing test that the Court has already utilized throughout its 
unconstitutional conditions in employment cases.162
Therefore, until disavowed by a subsequent Supreme Court decision, 
Lawrence stands, at the very least, for an analytical approach that requires a 
heightened form of judicial scrutiny whenever the government seeks to 
interfere with the private and personal decisions of adult individuals.163  In 
the allocation of decisionmaking roles.”); See also Dale Carpenter, 
Symposium: Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, Is Lawrence Libertarian, 
88 MINN. L. REV. 1140, 1155 (2004) (interpreting Lawrence to hold that the 
right to private, intimate association is a fundamental right); and Williams 
v. Attorney Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1251 (11th Cir. 2004) (Barkett, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Lawrence denominated a fundamental right to 
sexual privacy); and State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24, 29 (Kan. 2005) 
(applying Lawrence and reading it as applying a heightened form of rational 
basis review, rather than a strict scrutiny analysis reserved for fundamental 
rights or suspect classifications, in a case involving Kansas’ criminal 
Romeo and Juliet statute, which contained differential penalties for 
heterosexual and homosexual statutory rape).
160 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 ("Their right to liberty under the Due 
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without 
intervention of the government. 'It is a promise of the Constitution that there 
is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter.''') 
(quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 847).  See also Stein, supra note 122, at 536 
("[I]n Lawrence[,] the Court struck down state sodomy laws, reinterpreting 
Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe in ways that reject . . . the earlier Court's 
view that there is no right to engage in sex outside of marriage.").
161 See Secunda, supra note 40, at 136-138.  
162 See supra Part II.B.2.
163
 At the same time, Lawrence is equally clear concerning what it does 
not touch upon:
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve 
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other words, Lawrence "presumes an autonomy of self,"164 with the 
government’s having to put forward a legitimate and substantial interest to 
interfere with the personal and private decisional conduct of individuals.165
persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in 
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does 
not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve 
whether the government must give formal recognition to any 
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.  Thus, cases involving kids, prostitution, and 
drugs are generally not covered by the rights described in Lawrence.  But 
see State v. Limon, 122 P.3d 22, 24, 29 (Kan. 2005) (finding that Kansas’ 
criminal Romeo and Juliet statute, which contained differential penalties for 
heterosexual and homosexual statutory rape, lacked a rational basis under 
the guidance of Lawrence). 
164 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
165
 Unlike some other commentators, I do not believe the right described 
by Lawrence is limited to private conduct that takes place in the sanctity of 
the home.  See Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence 
v. Texas, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1399, 1400-01 (2004) (arguing that 
Lawrence relies on narrow version of liberty that is both "geographized and 
domesticated").  Although Lawrence derives from cases where home and 
sex play a large role, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 
(1965) ("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives?”); and Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (“Moreover, in the context of this case -
a prosecution for mere possession of printed or filmed matter in the privacy 
of a person's own home- that right takes on an added dimension. For also 
fundamental is the right to be free, except in very limited circumstances, 
from unwanted governmental intrusions into one's privacy.”), Lawrence is 
more in the tradition of Olmstead and the joint opinion in Casey in 
describing a liberty interest which is transcendental and non-material in its 
dimensions.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562 (“The instant case involves 
liberty of the person both in its spatial and more transcendent dimensions.) 
(emphasis added); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
851 (1992) (joint opinion) (“At the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life.”); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The [founding fathers] knew that only a 
part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material 
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, 
their emotions and their sensations.”).
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As a result, the right to decisional non-interference in private affairs may 
now take its rightful place next to other "preferred" constitutional interests, 
and, when infringed in relation to the granting of government benefits, must 
be analyzed under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.  The next 
section contends that this constitutional development in the area of 
substantive due process requires nothing less than a reformulation of the 
appropriate unconstitutional conditions test to protect these emerging 
constitutional interests.    
IV. THE IMPACT OF LAWRENCE V. TEXAS ON THE DOCTRINE OF     
UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT           
As previously illustrated, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine had 
been limited by and large to First Amendment considerations.166  Now, after 
Lawrence, there is a new type of constitutional liberty interest: the interest 
in decisional non-interference in private affairs, which is subject to some 
form of heightened judicial review.  As a result, public employers should 
have to show legitimate and substantial interests before interfering with the 
personal and private lives of their employees.  The next two sections 
elaborate on the inadequacy of the current First Amendment 
Connick/Pickering analysis for vindicating these public employee interests 
in decisional non-interference and, in its stead, propose a modified 
Pickering test, which is consistent with other constitutional tests utilized to 
protect the constitutional interests of public employees.
A.  The Incongruence Between the Interest in Decisional Non-
Interference in Private Affairs and the Connick/Pickering Analysis
Quite simply put, the current First Amendment model for public 
employee speech rights is inadequate to vindicate the interests of 
individuals in decisional non-interference in private affairs because of the 
public concern test.  As set out above, the current Connick/Pickering
analysis requires at the threshold that a court consider whether the public 
employee is speaking out on a matter of public concern.167  Needless to say, 
these same concerns normally do not justify a public concern test in the 
post-Lawrence substantive due process rights context.   Here, the issue is 
not the ability of the public employees to speak out or express themselves 
on pressing social, political, or communal issues,168 but, quite to the 
166 See supra Part II.C.
167 See supra Part II.B.2. 
168 See Connick, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) ("When employee expression 
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contrary, it is the ability to retain a modicum of autonomy and personal 
space without jeopardizing one's public employment.  In this regard, a case 
in which a public employer seeks to make a female employee marry her 
live-in boyfriend or else face discharge from her job does not implicate any 
real First Amendment rights. Consequently, the test for post-Lawrence 
substantive due process rights envisioned here does not include the public 
concern test.169
This is not to say that there might not be the rare case in which a public 
employee will be able to call upon both her First Amendment expression 
rights and Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process rights.  This is 
because there could be instances where an employee is both seeking to 
express herself on a matter of public concern, while at the same time 
seeking a measure of personal space for her private conduct.170  For an 
cannot be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community, government officials should enjoy wide 
latitude in managing their offices, without intrusive oversight by the 
judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.").
169
 Some may argue that something like a threshold test for Lawrence 
right cases is needed to properly take into account the increased leeway that 
government has in its employer capacity.  Nonetheless, not all constitutional 
balancing tests have a threshold test like the public concern test; indeed, the 
privacy interests of public employees under the Fourth Amendment have 
been subjected to a balancing test without the use of any gate-keeping or 
threshold test.  See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 
U.S. 656 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 
616-618 (1989); Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 
158 F.3d 361 (6th Cir. 1998).
170
 It would appear that if one had the choice of frameworks, one might 
choose the Connick/Pickering line of cases since these cases recognize that 
political speech is at the heart of the First Amendment.  See Connick, 461 
U.S. at 145 (“The explanation for the Constitution's special concern with 
threats to the right of citizens to participate in political affairs is no mystery. 
The First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of 
ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.’”) (citing Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); and
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964)). On the other hand, 
although this article maintains that there is a heightened interest 
surrounding the right to decisional non-interference in private affairs after 
Lawrence, the relative importance of these rights on the constitutional 
spectrum still remains to be determined and thus, is almost certainly not at 
the level of political speech rights.  
31-Jan-06]      The (Neglected) Importance of Being Lawrence 39
example of one of these rare cases, consider the NAMBLA case,171 which 
concerned the rights of a public school teacher pedophile to advocate on his 
free time for the legalization of man-boy sexual relationships.172   Not only 
were his First Amendment free speech rights at issue under 
Connick/Pickering,173 but one could argue that his interest in decisional 
non-interference in private affairs might have also been at stake, as long as 
he was not seeking to commit the criminal act of child molestation.174  On 
the other hand, there would appear to be abundant factual scenarios under 
which interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs will be the 
only way to vindicate a public employee's constitutional rights.175
In short, the point of this brief section is merely to make evident what 
may already be obvious to many.  An employee's interest in decisional non-
interference by her employer may infrequently be synonymous with that 
employee's First Amendment rights.  Nevertheless, there is a substantially 
larger category of cases in which the employee will only be able to depend 
on an interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs.  It is these 
171 See Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 540 U.S. 1183 (2004).  NAMBLA refers to the "North American 
Man/Boy Love Association." 
172 See id. at 189. 
173
 Indeed, the NAMBLA member, Mr. Melzer, lost his case under the 
Connick/Pickering analysis.  See id. at 199.
174
 To be clear, this analysis assumes, as the court did, that Mr. Melzer 
did not base his claim on the right to engage in criminal pedophilia.  See id.
at 189 ("[T]he record before us reveals no evidence that plaintiff engaged in 
any illegal or inappropriate conduct at [his public school]. Plaintiff's outlet 
as a pedophile is his participation in NAMBLA, which he joined in 1979 or 
1980 to discuss with others his long-standing attraction to young boys.").  If 
Mr. Melzer had engaged in such criminal conduct away from work, his 
actions would not be saved by his heightened substantive due process under 
Lawrence.  See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578 (“The present case does not 
involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced 
or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be 
refused.”).
175
 Some common examples would include instances in which public 
employees were terminated from their jobs for having a live-in boyfriend, 
being gay, for seeking an abortion, or for using contraception.  Other 
examples might include instances in which a public employee is fired for 
visiting a gay bar, participating in an adult internet chat room, or for 
engaging in even more risqué off-duty conduct.  See infra discussion Part 
V.B.
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cases which require a reconstructed doctrinal model to vindicate these post-
Lawrence substantive due process rights. 
B.  A New Model: The Modified Pickering Analysis
1. The Basics
Even without the public concern test of Connick, the Pickering 
balancing test must be altered to meet the decisional autonomy concerns of 
public employees.  As presently stated, the test balances the interests of the 
employee as citizen in speaking out on matters of public concern and the 
interest of the state as employer in running an efficient government 
service.176  The state's interests in this regard generally remain the same177
and more specifically include the government's interest in having loyal 
subordinates, in having co-workers who can work together, in maintaining a 
favorable public image in the community, and in fulfilling its public 
mission.178
On the other side of the ledger, the employee's interests need to be 
substantially redefined.  The emphasis is no longer on the ability of the 
employee-citizens to speak out or express themselves on matters of public 
concern.  Instead, the issue is being free from unwanted governmental 
intrusions with respect to decisions relating to matters concerning one's 
private and personal life.179  Specifically, a government employee should be 
able "to be free, except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted 
governmental intrusions into [his or her] privacy."180  Moreover, there 
should be a "zone of autonomy, of presumptive immunity to governmental 
176 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). 
177 See Solove, supra note 14, at 2 (observing that the governmental 
interests in such balancing tests "are often much more readily articulated.").
178 See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987) (citing
Pickering, 391 U.S.  at 570-73).  As Kozel has perceptively argued, 
Pickering is really about an employee not engaging in speech or conduct 
which causes a substantial disruption to the employer.  See Kozel, supra 
note 79, at 1019 ("The Pickering/Connick doctrine collapses into little more 
than the constitutionalization of a heckler's veto."); see also Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 1969) (also relying upon 
"substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities" in 
regulating the political speech of students in school).
179 See Solove, supra note 14, at 55.
180 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (discussing privacy 
rights in the First Amendment context).
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regulation."181  As such, anytime the government as employer seeks to 
justify an intrusion into an employee's sacrosanct zone of decisional non-
interference, a legitimate and substantial justification must be set forth.182
Thus, the modified Pickering balancing test for public employees' 
substantive due process rights should balance the employee’s interest as 
citizen in being free from unwanted and unjustified governmental intrusions 
in the employee's personal and private life against the government's interest 
as employer in running an efficient governmental service for the benefit of 
the public.183   At times, this balance will obviously be strongly in favor of 
either the government or the employee, depending on whether the 
employee's off-duty actions have any impact on the employer.  If there is no 
impact, analogizing to the Court's conclusion in NTEU,184 the employee's 
interests will normally prevail.185   Also, easy cases will involve instances in 
which the employee is engaging in a certain line of private conduct 
explicitly not protected by Lawrence, such as cases involving minors or 
commercial conduct such as prostitution.186
But the more numerous and difficult cases will fall somewhere in 
between these antipodes.  For these more intricate cases, it is helpful to 
consider the "nexus test" used for employee discharges by labor arbitrators 
in the union environment.  As described elsewhere,187 the general principle 
is that an employer should not be able to interfere with an employee's life 
outside of work unless there is more than a de minimis adverse impact on 
181 See Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 
1411 (1974). 
182 See supra note 26.
183
 To reiterate, even though the Pickering case analogy is utilized to 
label this test, the modified Pickering analysis would only apply to 
constitutional balancing of employees' substantive due process rights and 
government employers' efficiency concerns, not to First Amendment cases 
concerning freedom of speech, expression, or association.  See supra note 
19.
184 See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 
U.S. 454 (1995).  
185 See id. at 465 ("Neither the character of the authors, the subject 
matter of their expression, the effect of the content of their expression on 
their official duties, nor the kind of audiences they address have any 
relevance to their employment."). 
186 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
187 See Paul M. Secunda, Getting to the Nexus of the Matter: A Sliding 
Scale Approach to Faculty-Student Consensual Relationship Policies in 
Higher Education, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 55, 68-73 (2004).
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the employer's work place.188  This impact can be measured based on the 
detriment to the employer's public image, the inability of the worker to 
interact with her co-employees, or the simple inability of the employee to 
carry out the essential functions of her position as a result of her private 
conduct.189  But outside of these types of legitimate and substantial 
justifications for interference in an employee's private life, a government 
employer should be constrained by the liberty interest contained in the 
substantive component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments from interfering with the personal and private lives 
of their employees.    
2. The Coherency Between the Modified Pickering Test and Other 
Constitutional Protections Afforded Public Employees
In establishing this modified Pickering analysis to protect the interests 
of public employees in decisional non-interference in private affairs, this 
article by no means draws upon a blank slate.  Instead, it takes its cues 
directly from other areas of constitutional law in which the constitutional 
rights of public employees are also at stake.
In this regard, one needs look no further for an apt analogy than cases 
concerning the permissibility of drug testing public employees.190 Although 
188 See id. at 69; see also Kozel, supra note 79, at 1051 (noting that the 
Supreme Court has made a distinction in public employee speech cases 
based on whether the speech or expression in question included any indicia 
of the speaker's employment). 
189 See id. at 70 (citing W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab. Arb. Rep. (BNA) 
434, 436-37 (1957) (Kesselman, Arb.)). Compare Bd. of County Comm’rs 
v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674 (1996) ("The government needs to be free to 
terminate both employees and contractors for poor performance, to improve 
the efficiency, efficacy, and responsiveness of service to the public, and to 
prevent the appearance of corruption."); and Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 
134, 168 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[T]he Government's interest is 
the maintenance of employee efficiency and discipline . . . To this end, the 
Government, as an employer, must have wide discretion and control over 
the management of its personnel and internal affairs.").
190 See, e.g., Nat’l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656 (1989) (permitting suspicionless drug search of federal Custom agents); 
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-618 (1989) 
(upholding federal regulations requiring employees of private railroads to 
produce urine samples for drug testing upon the occurrence of an accident);  
Knox County Educ. Ass’n v. Knox County Bd. of Educ., 158 F.3d 361 (6th 
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these cases involve a Fourth Amendment analysis regarding the 
reasonableness of the search and seizure involved,191 many of the same 
concerns which have animated the discussion in this paper are also apparent 
in the Fourth Amendment context. 
For example, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the 
question presented was whether federal custom agents could be subjected to 
drug urinalysis testing as a condition of their being promoted or 
transferred.192  Using the administrative search criterion and the "special 
needs" test under the Fourth Amendment,193 the court engaged in a 
constitutional balancing test based on a standard of reasonableness,194
Cir. 1998) (permitting the drug testing of public school teachers), cert. 
denied, 528 U.S. 812 (1999).  But cf. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 
(1997) (striking down drug testing requirements for candidates for high 
public office in Georgia). 
191 See U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and 
seizure, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.").  The Supreme Court has already settled that the Fourth 
Amendment protects individuals from unreasonable searches conducted by 
the government, even when the government acts as an employer.  See
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 715 (1987) (plurality opinion).
192 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 659. 
193
 Although a government search must normally be supported by a 
warrant issued upon probable cause, see, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 
U.S. 868, 873 (1987), neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor any 
measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of 
reasonableness in every circumstance. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 
325, 342, n. 8, (1985); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556-
561 (1976).  In administrative searches, for instance, the government is able 
to proceed without a search warrant when the "special needs" of the search 
so require.  See, e.g., Ortega, 480 U.S. at 722 (the need of an employer to 
enter an employee's office, desk, or files comprises "special need" and no 
warrant is required); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340-41 (finding warrant 
requirement unsuited to school context because it unduly interferes with the 
maintenance of swift and informal disciplinary procedures).
194
 "Where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, it is necessary to 
balance the individual's privacy expectations against the Government's 
interests to determine whether it is impractical to require a warrant or some 
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noting that the immediacy of the government's concern and the minimal 
nature of the intrusion outweighed the individual's interest in privacy and 
permitted the government to undertake drug testing of the custom agents.195
The importance in ensuring that these federal employees were drug free was 
paramount because these custom officers carried guns and interdicted 
drugs.196
Similarly, in the context of substantive due process rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, a comparable, finely attuned balancing of interests 
test could be applied.  As in Von Raab, the context of the employee's job 
should be given substantial weight in determining the justification of an 
intrusion.197  For instance, police officers and other public officials that deal 
with guns and other sensitive information could be subjected to more 
intrusive searches than, say, your average civilian clerk for a 
municipality.198  On the other hand, just because an employee is employed 
by law enforcement, does not mean that the employer, especially after 
Lawrence, should dictate every aspect of how that employee chooses to live 
her private life.199  In fact, Lawrence itself makes clear that the morality of 
level of individualized suspicion in the particular context."  Skinner, 489 
U.S. at 619-20.
195 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 677 ("In sum, we believe the Government has 
demonstrated that its compelling interests in safeguarding our borders and 
the public safety outweigh the privacy expectations of employees who seek 
to be promoted to positions that directly involve the interdiction of illegal 
drugs or that require the incumbent to carry a firearm."). 
196 See id. at 672 ("We think Customs employees who are directly 
involved in the interdiction of illegal drugs or who are required to carry 
firearms in the line of duty likewise have a diminished expectation of 
privacy in respect to the intrusions occasioned by a urine test.").
197 See id. at 671 ("[I]t is plain that certain forms of public employment 
may diminish privacy expectations even with respect to such personal 
searches.").  
198 Accord id. at 671 ("Employees of the United States Mint, for 
example, should expect to be subject to certain routine personal searches 
when they leave the workplace every day. Similarly, those who join our 
military or intelligence services may not only be required to give what in 
other contexts might be viewed as extraordinary assurances of 
trustworthiness and probity, but also may expect intrusive inquiries into 
their physical fitness for those special positions.").
199 See Hartsoe, supra note 91, at A06 (describing actions of North 
Carolina sheriff in forcing a dispatcher to choose between her job and living 
together with her boyfriend).
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one's employer will generally not be sufficient to outweigh the substantial 
interests an employee has in making important life decisions unrestricted by 
governmental interference.200
In short, current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence surrounding drug 
testing of public employees lends support to the modified Pickering 
analysis articulated in this paper.
V. APPLYING THE MODIFIED PICKERING TEST: OF 
PORNOGRAPHIC POLICEMAN, SWINGING SCHOOL TEACHERS, AND 
SALACIOUS SHERIFF DISPATCHERS
So how will this modified Pickering balance actually work in practice?  
In order to see how this new analysis would play out in a real world case, 
one only has to look at the case of the pornographic policeman. Therefore, 
the first section of this Part asks whether this new test would have made any 
difference in the outcome of City of San Diego v. Roe.   Concluding that the 
outcome of this case would most likely have been the same, the second 
section nevertheless predicts that the ascendancy of public employees' 
interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs post-Lawrence will 
greatly increase their protection from illegitimate and arbitrary interference 
into their private and personal lives by their government employers.
A.  Of Pornographic Policemen
1. Applying the Connick/Pickering First Amendment Analysis
To jog the memory of the reader, the case of the pornographic 
policeman in San Diego v. Roe201  involved whether John Roe could engage 
in pornographic activities outside of his police work.202  The Supreme Court 
carried out a straightforward First Amendment Connick/Pickering 
analysis.203   More specifically, the Court came to the conclusion that John 
200 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577-578 (upholding Justice Steven's view 
in his Bowers dissent that "the fact that the governing majority in a State has 
traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient 
reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice.").
201
 125 S. Ct. 521 (2004) (per curiam).
202 See supra notes 2-6 and accompanying text.
203
 In applying the Connick/Pickering analysis to this case, the Court 
found that the NTEU case does not stand for the proposition that, "off-the-
job, non-employment related speech should generally merit strong 
protection under the Pickering balancing test."  See Kozel, supra note 79, at 
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Roe's conduct did not deserve First Amendment protection under either the 
NTEU or Connick/Pickering line of cases.204
Under NTEU, involving the honoraria ban for federal employees, the 
Court observed that even if one were to concede that John Roe was 
speaking on a matter of public concern, which he was not, NTEU was not 
the appropriate precedent.205  That is because the speech and expression of 
the federal employees in NTEU had absolutely nothing to do with their 
federal employment.206  Of course, it goes without saying that under such 
circumstances, the balance between government interests and employee 
interests swings wildly in favor of the employee.  On the other hand, John 
Roe unstintingly attempted to take advantage of his status as a law 
enforcement officer to pad his own pocket through pornographic activities.  
For instance, not only was John Roe selling old San Diego police uniforms 
on eBay,207 but he listed in his personal profile online that he was 
"employed in the field of law enforcement."208  Also, and quite damningly, 
the pornographic tape that he unwittingly sold to an undercover detective 
depicted him in a non-affiliated police uniform engaging in police activities 
and sex acts at the same time.209  Finally, even though John Roe used a fake 
AOL account name and did not disclose his name on eBay (going so far to 
set up a private mailbox for his pornographic business in northern 
California),210 nevertheless, he was readily identifiable by individuals who 
1050.   Instead, the John Roe Court foreclosed the idea that NTEU created a 
presumption in favor of protecting off-duty speech or expression by 
refusing to apply NTEU to the facts of John Roe.  See John Roe, 125 S. Ct. 
at 524. The important distinction between the two cases is that NTEU 
involved speech on matters of public concern while John Roe clearly did 
not.  See id.
204 See id. at 523-24.
205 See id. at 524 ("The present case falls outside the protection afforded 
in NTEU."). 
206 See id. ("The Court [in NTEU] . . . observed that none of the speech 
at issue 'even arguably [had] any adverse impact' on the employer.") 
(quoting NTEU, 513 U.S. at 465).
207 See id. at 523.
208 Id.
209 See id.  In particular, the video in question showed Roe, initially in 
police uniform, issuing a traffic ticket, only to revoke it after stripping and 
masturbating in front of the ticketed driver.  See id.
210 See John Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 522; San Diego v. Roe, NO. 03-1669, 
2004 WL 1877785, at *2 (U.S. Aug. 17, 2004) (Brief in Opposition to 
Petition for Certiorari). 
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worked with him (including the sergeant who reported him).211
Moreover, and as the John Roe Court actually held, John Roe's conduct 
clearly did not "qualify as a matter of public concern under any view of the 
public concern test."212  Thus, under both NTEU and Connick/Pickering, the 
per curiam decision was rightly decided under the First Amendment.
2. Applying the Modified Pickering Test to John Roe’s Substantive Due 
Process Rights
What if the Court had considered John Roe's interest in decisional non-
interference in private affairs?213  Would the case have had a different 
outcome?  Most likely not.  Although there would have been some obvious 
differences in the analysis,214 the problem with the John Roe case under the 
modified Pickering analysis is similar to those endemic to any type of 
constitutional balancing test: the more unpopular or disruptive the public 
employee's off-duty conduct to the employer's workplace, the more likely 
that the Pickering balance will favor the employer's efficiency interests.215
Because the knowledge of John Roe's off-duty pornographic conduct would 
have caused a significant disruption in the San Diego police department, it 
is likely that any interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs 
that John Roe had would have been outweighed by the legitimate and 
substantial efficiency interests of his employer.216
211 See Roe, 125 S. Ct. at 523.
212 See id. at 526.
213
 John Roe filed his complaint in the Southern District of California on 
September 28, 2001. See San Diego v. Roe, NO. 03-1669, 2004 WL 
1378662, at *4 (U.S. Jun. 17, 2004) (Appellate Petition, Motion and Filing 
in support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari).   Consequently, John Roe's 
attorney did not have Lawrence-based arguments at his disposal initially 
and would have been foreclosed from brining up any such new legal 
theories of recovery for the first time on appeal. 
214
 Most obviously, John Roe would not have been thrown out of court 
on the relatively easy ground that his conduct was not within the traditional 
realm of public concern.  Moreover, rather than focusing on speech rights 
under the First Amendment, the Court under the proposed test would have 
had to instead focus on John Roe's rights to decisional non-interference in 
private affairs.    
215 See Kozel, supra note 79, at 1018-1019.
216
 John Roe is even a less sympathetic plaintiff because he 
transparently attempted to use the fact of his police department employment 
to his private advantage and to his employer's detriment.  See John Roe, 125 
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Perhaps even more importantly, the John Roe facts differ from the 
substantive due process rights upheld in Lawrence in at least four important 
ways.  First, the conduct in question did not occur in the privacy of John 
Roe's home.217  The Supreme Court appears to be most comfortable 
upholding liberty interests under substantive due process when the privacy 
of the home is involved.218   Second, producing the type of pornography that 
John Roe produced does not involve engaging in an intimate, sexual 
relationship as part of forging a meaningful human relationship as the 
Lawrence case did.219  Third, law enforcement officers, because of the 
nature of their responsibilities, are given far less leeway in their off-duty 
conduct than other types of government workers.220  Finally, John Roe's 
conduct in producing and distributing the pornographic videotapes was both 
public and commercial at the same time and therefore, unlikely even to be 
covered by the interests recognized in Lawrence.221
In short, John Roe would have most likely lost his case even if his 
interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs had been taken into 
account under a modified Pickering test. This is because, as demonstrated 
above, the government's efficiency concerns would remain at a high level, 
and, if anything, John Roe's interest in decisional non-interference in private 
S. Ct. at 526.
217
 As discussed above, the United States Supreme Court has placed 
significant emphasis on whether conduct was engaged in by individuals in 
the privacy of their home.  See supra note 165 and accompanying text. 
218 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) 
("Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital 
bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is 
repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."); 
see also Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973) (finding that 
constitutional "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal 
intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and 
child rearing.").  See also Stein, supra note 122, at 535. 
219
 In pre-Lawrence terminology, the right to intimacy is lacking since 
John Roe's conduct did not include the forging of the bonds of a personal 
relationship.  See supra discussion Part III.A.3.
220 See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 245 (1976) ("[Law 
enforcement] employer has, in accordance with its well-established duty to 
keep the peace, placed myriad demands upon the members of the police 
force, duties which have no counterpart with respect to the public at 
large.").  
221 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ("The present 
case does not involve . . . public conduct or prostitution.). 
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affairs would be minimal given the facts of the case.    
B.  Of Swinging School Teachers and Salacious Sheriff Dispatchers
Nevertheless, just because our pornographic policeman does not benefit 
from the doctrinal innovation introduced in this paper, it does not mean that 
other public employees will not gain important, additional constitutional 
protections which they currently do not have under the First Amendment 
Connick/Pickering analysis.  In order to discern the impact that these 
interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs, and the modified 
Pickering analysis, will have on public employees' substantive due process 
rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it is necessary to turn to 
a consideration of a number of real world and hypothetical cases to flesh out 
the contours of this analysis.
1. The Easier Cases Under the Modified Pickering Analysis: The Sheriff 
Dispatcher
 The easier cases under the modified Pickering analysis will involve 
well-established privacy rights that public employees had pre-Lawrence.  
For instance, an employer would run afoul of an employee’s interest in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs if the employee discharged the 
employee for using contraception or for having an abortion. 222  Now, post-
Lawrence, easier cases should also include those in which someone is fired 
for being homosexual or, for that matter, having any private relationships 
between consenting adults that do not adversely impact the participants' 
employment.223  The North Carolina cohabitation case currently being 
222
 These would be relatively straightforward unconstitutional 
conditions cases because the government as employer would be seeking to 
prevent indirectly, i.e., the use of contraception or abortion, which it could 
not prevent directly through the conditioning of a government benefit, i.e., 
government employment. See Sullivan, supra note 29, at 1421-22 
("Unconstitutional conditions problems arise when government offers a 
benefit on condition that the recipient perform of forego an activity that a 
preferred constitutional right normally protects from government 
interference.").
223
 Recall again the case in which a female attorney in the employ of the 
infamous Mr. Bowers was fired for being a lesbian. See Shahar v. Bowers, 
114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997).  In 1997, the Eleventh Circuit was able to 
uphold the discharge of that attorney under a very deferential rational basis 
review analysis following the Bowers precedent.  See id. at 1110-1111.  
50 Paul M. Secunda [31-Jan-06
litigated by the ACLU is another prime example.224  There, a female sheriff 
dispatcher, who lived with her boyfriend, claimed that she was forced to 
quit her job by the Sheriff when she would not either marry her boyfriend or 
move out of the house.225  In support of his position, the Sheriff relied upon 
an 1805 "adultery and fornication" statute which prohibited cohabitation of 
unmarried persons.226  The pending lawsuit challenges the continuing 
validity of such cohabitation statutes post-Lawrence.227
Because Lawrence itself deals with consensual sex between two 
individuals in the privacy of their home,228 and because there are potential 
criminal sanctions at stake for violating the cohabitation statute in 
question,229 there can be little doubt that this case will be directly controlled 
by reference to the substantive due process rights discussed in Lawrence.  In 
this vein, and in the language of the modified Pickering test, the 
government employer cannot condition the benefit of public employment on 
an employee’s sacrificing her right to engage in a private relationship, 
especially when that relationship has no nexus to the employee's work 
duties.230  Notice this would be true whether that relationship involved a 
Post-Lawrence, a court's consideration of a public employee’s rights to 
decisional non-interference in private affairs in future cases should make 
firing for being homosexual or lesbian an illegitimate and arbitrary factor 
upon which to base a discharge, and, in such cases, the modified Pickering 
balance would come out in favor of the employee.  Accord Eskridge, supra 
note 15, at 1056 (arguing that, after Lawrence, a state cannot tell gay people 
"that they are presumptive outlaws who can for that reason be denied civil 
service employment, licenses, and various state benefits.  Nor can the state 
tell gay people that the price of citizenship for them is to remain in the 
closet."); and id. at 1058 ("[M]ost of the state and local discriminations 
explicitly targeting lesbian and gay citizens ought to be suspect after Romer
and Lawrence.").
224 See Hartsoe, supra note 91, at A06.
225 See id..
226 See id.   The North Carolina "adultery and fornication" statue states: 
"If any man and woman, not being married to each other, shall lewdly and 
lasciviously associate, bed, and cohabit together, they shall be guilty of a 
Class 2 misdemeanor."  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2005). 
227 See Hartsoe, supra note 91, at A06.
228 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572 (observing the “emerging awareness 
that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”).
229 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184.
230 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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heterosexual or homosexual relationship, or for that matter, a married or 
unmarried couple. Thus, under the modified Pickering analysis, because the 
government’s interest in interfering with its employee's interest in 
decisional non-interference in private affairs is not supported by a 
legitimate or substantial justification outside of the state’s own moral 
proclivities concerning unmarried men and women living together,231 the 
government's efficiency interests would be clearly outweighed by the 
individual's interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs. 
2. The More Difficult Cases Under the Modified Pickering Analysis: The 
Swinging School Teacher
Unfortunately, many of the future cases involving these interests in 
decisional non-interference will not involve the easier type of scenarios 
described in the previous section.  Instead, the majority of these cases will 
likely require a careful analysis of both the governmental interests in 
efficiency and freedom from disruption on the one hand, and the strength of 
the employee's post-Lawrence substantive due process rights on the other.  
A few examples will suffice to establish some of the analytical intricacies 
that will no doubt occur in these complicated cases.
For instance, consider the difficulties with any activity which a public 
employee engages in on his private or personal time which brings great 
notoriety to his employer.   In these cases, it is more likely that the 
employee would lose any subsequent constitutional balancing, as the 
disruption entailed by the employee's private conduct will likely 
overshadow any interest in decisional non-interference that an employee 
might have.232  In this regard, consider a police officer who in his spare time 
is a porn star.  Regardless of the nature of the employee interests involved, 
the need to maintain the credibility of its police officers and its own 
reputation will probably permit the employer to take constitutionally 
permissible, adverse employment actions against that employee.233
231 Lawrence makes clear that the promotion of a majoritarian morality 
is not a sufficient government interest to outweigh an individual's right to 
freely exercise their rights to decisional non-interference in private affairs.  
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003) (adopting Justice 
Steven's dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick).  See also Eskridge, supra note 15, 
at 1045 (observing that the Court in Lawrence found that popular disgust of 
homosexual sodomy could not supply the rational basis under the Due 
Process Clause for making homosexual sodomy a crime).  
232 See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
233 See City of San Diego v. Roe, 125 S. Ct. 521, 526 (2004) (per 
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Likewise, the same outcome would result in a case involving a public 
elementary school teacher who is exposed publicly as engaging in a swinger 
lifestyle outside of school.  Because of the sensitive nature of the public 
school teacher's position and the importance for these individuals to model 
appropriate behavior for children,234 the efficiency concerns of the public 
employer will most likely outweigh the decisional autonomy interests of the 
teacher in these circumstances as well.
Consider another difficult set of facts.  John Doe is still an employee 
who is a police officer, and thus more highly regulated, but, unlike John 
Roe, he does not engage in pornographic activities.  Instead, he films 
himself and his wife engaging in consensual sexual intercourse for their 
private use, but unfortunately the videotape is stolen by an acquaintance and 
ends up being distributed widely on the Internet.  When the police 
department learns of the tape and the adverse reaction the tape is causing in 
the community, the police officer is fired.  Under a modified Pickering 
analysis, can this police officer be constitutionally discharged?
On the one hand, the carrying out of a personal relationship, especially 
in the marital bedroom,235 is due much freedom from governmental 
incursions.236  Moreover, the police officer did not wish for this tape to 
become public and the tape became public through no efforts of his own.  
On the other hand, regardless of the police officer's desire not to have this 
videotape placed on the Internet, the fact of the matter is that it now exists 
in cyberspace and the officer's credibility and that of his department are on 
the line.  If the police department can show substantial disruptions to its 
operations and that a public safety issue has now arisen as a result of the 
distractions caused by the scandal, the department will most likely be able 
to discharge the officer.  Nonetheless, this type of case will no doubt require 
curiam) (stressing the importance of the impact of the public employee’s 
private conduct on the “mission and functions” of the public employer in 
this type of unconstitutional conditions analysis); and United States v. Nat'l 
Treasury Employees Union (NTEU), 513 U.S. 454, 465 (1995) (observing 
that that none of the speech at issue “even arguably [had] any adverse 
impact on the employer.").
234 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Schs., 533 U.S. 98, 116 
(2001) (observing "that students are susceptible to pressure in the 
classroom, particularly given their possible reliance on teachers as role 
models.") (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)).  
235 See supra note 165. 
236 See Paris Adult Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); Griswold 
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965). See also discussion supra note 
222 and accompanying text.  
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a careful balancing by the court and may turn on such case-sensitive factors 
as the size of the municipality, the extent of the public's knowledge of the 
tape, and the type of sexual conduct displayed on the videotape. 
Similarly, more difficult issues arise when a public employee acts as the 
public face of the employer.  This is because of the potential message the 
employer is sending to the public by keeping the employee in employment 
after the employee engages in the controversial conduct.237  For instance, 
what if the police chief is caught engaging in an extramarital affair off-duty, 
and this conduct is made public.  Does the employer, for efficiency reasons, 
have more latitude to terminate the chief, even though the chief would 
appear to have post-Lawrence substantive due process rights to engage in 
consensual sexual relations with another person on his own time?238  Does it 
depend on the geographic location in which the scenario occurs and that 
community’s mores? Perhaps, a police chief in a small, conservative town 
would be discharged, while a police chief in a large, liberal metropolitan 
city would face no adverse employment action.  Should the constitutional 
interests in decisional non-interference in private affairs be different in 
different parts of the country?239  These are all very difficult questions 
which will have to be weighed by the lower courts in deciding these 
complex cases.  
In short, there may sometimes be no clear-cut answers to the complex 
questions posed by these post-Lawrence cases; nevertheless, public 
employees are no doubt better off as a whole as a result of Lawrence and its 
elevation of the right to decisional non-interference in private affairs to a 
preferred constitutional liberty interest.  To what extent public employees 
237 See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) ("The 
Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to send one message but 
not the other.").  It is anything but clear if government institutions are 
expressive associations, but even if they are not, the modified Pickering 
analysis would still give credence to government efficiency concerns, which 
would include the government employer’s right to maintain a certain image 
or reputation within a community.
238
 This scenario assumes there are no applicable statutory or common 
law prohibitions against engaging in extra-marital relationships.  
239
 Such an outcome would place these cases in a category similar to 
First Amendment obscenity cases in which courts utilize, in part, a 
contemporary community standards test.  See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 
15, 24 (1973) (“The basic guidelines for the trier of fact must be: (a) 
whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient 
interest.”).
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are better off will depend to a large extent on how the lower federal courts 
interpret the scope of these interests in the coming years.  But at the very 
least, Lawrence, with the aid of the modified Pickering test, should provide 
much greater protection to public employees against arbitrary and 
meddlesome government overreaching that unnecessarily treads into the 
secret regions of their lives.
CONCLUSION
This paper argues that whatever debates continue to stew regarding the 
"true" meaning of Lawrence v. Texas, at the very least, Lawrence represents 
the recognition of an individual's heightened interest in decisional non-
interference in private affairs.240 This is an important constitutional 
development since a problem under the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions only arises when the government offers a benefit, like 
government employment, conditioned on the waiver of a preferred 
constitutional right.   Thus, a government employer, post-Lawrence, should 
be prohibited under the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions from firing a 
government employee who exercises her interests in decisional non-
interference in private affairs.  
However, the current protections for public employee speech rights 
under the Connick/Pickering analysis do not adequately safeguard these 
emerging interests in decisional non-interference.  The proposed modified 
Pickering test discards the unnecessary “public concern test” for these post-
Lawrence substantive due process cases and, in the first instance, balances 
the employee’s interest in decisional non-interference in private affairs 
against the government’s interest in operating an efficient governmental 
service for the public.  The upshot, and a much neglected impact of the 
Lawrence decision, is that over twenty-one million federal, state, and local 
United States’ employees should be the beneficiaries in coming years of a 
significant expansion of their interests in being free from arbitrary and 
capricious interference by their employers in their personal and private 
lives.
240
 Eskridge, supra note 15, at 1012 ("[F]ew constitutional scholars 
think the narrowest or the broadest reading of Lawrence is correct. Its 
charged reasoning cannot be limited to the sodomy context alone, but 
neither does it entail same-sex marriage."). 
